

December 10, 1971 - I got a call from Commander Howe at the White House. He told me that Henry and Al Haig were on their way up here and that we were to have another meeting similar to the one we had on the 23rd. He gave me the address on East 74th Street. I gave Aleene Smith the phone number before going to the meeting. I left no word where I was going. Just before I left the office Commander Howe called, warning me to take a certain telegram regarding Pakistan-India. In the morning there had been a big flap because the military commander in East Pakistan had offered terms which were later in the day pulled back. The new terms offered by the Governor in East Pakistan, Mr. Malik, were covered by the telegram Howe was referring to. Kissinger and Haig had not seen the telegram and so Al wanted me to take the telegram up. I was met at the door by Winston Lord and taken into the apartment. Kissinger and Haig showed up in a few minutes and shortly after that Huang Hua and his deputy with two interpreters appeared. Henry unfolded our whole policy on India-Pakistan, saying that we were very parallel with the Chinese. Kissinger talked about the fact that we would be moving some ships into the area, talked about military

supplies being sent from Jordan, Turkey and Iran. He said he had heard about the massing of troops along the Soviet border and that we would be glad to give information about that if we could. He talked about aid to keep the government in East Pakistan from falling. He discussed a presidential letter from Breshnev in which Breshnev discussed with President Nixon the need for a cease-fire and a political accommodation in the East (no mention of Bangla Desh). Huang replied that this was no good. This was a Russian line. Kissinger tried to point out to him that it wasn't a choice of what was right or wrong, it was the fact that the Pakistan army was going to fall in a day or two. We must find a way to keep West Pakistan stable and whole, India having indicated that they wanted to make moves into a certain part of Kashmir after they polished off East Pakistan. Huang Hua gave a long lecture on the encirclement theory, on the fact that they would have to institute guerrilla warfare if necessary. He gave no indication as to whether they were going to militarily support the operation although Kissinger hinted this would be the thing to do. He asked whether Ambassador Bush had met with the Bengla Desh which is really a dirty word as far as they are concerned. I pointed out that there had been a squib in the paper about that but Justice Chowdbury

had come under false colors having come as a member of the Third Committee who wanted to pay his respects to me. He had come accompanied with a defector from the Pakistan Mission. It was a source of great embarrassment, and the visit had taken place two or three weeks ago, not in the last two days as the New York Times story in the December 9th or 10th paper had indicated. Henry told him that we would be willing to support whatever kind of resolution they wanted at the UN. This worried me a little for they are talking about very strong, condemnatory language. He also was willing to discuss in great detail communications and plans vis-a-vis the Soviets. Henry told him he was going to meet with Bhutto and tell him he should listen to only Henry and Haig, not anybody in the State Department.

Henry makes very clear to Huang that he has complications at the State Department. The State Department to him is an increasing obsession. He is absolutely obsessed by the idea that they are incompetent and can't get the job done. It comes out all the time. I mentioned to him that just before I came Chris Phillips had asked my judgment as to whether Rogers should land in New York on his

return back from Europe or whether he should go right to Washington. Knowing the White House situation my judgment was that he should go down to Washington and get fully briefed. Then if he wanted to come see Bhutto and Warren Singh so much the better. I mentioned this to Kissinger and he just went through the roof. He placed a call to Alec Johnson and told Alec he had been talking to me and that I had been asked for a judgment on the matter. In his view Rogers ought to go to Washington. The situation is getting increasingly intolerable. I do not see how I can always stay out of the cross-fire but of course shall be trying.

Nixon has urged restraint on Breshnev during this crisis and had good communications with Breshnev. The White House had also corresponded the Breshnev message to Ambassador Farland without going through State Department channels, telling Farland to pass the Breshnev communique on the cease-fire and political settlements along to Yahya without urging the course of action upon Yahya.

I had to see Bhutto until 8:00 p.m. The meeting lasted over two hours.

There is something about all of this that bothers me. Kissinger told Huang Hua that he was giving the back-grounder to demonstrate what we have been telling the press, that we are for Pakistan. I leaned over and reminded Al Haig that the backgrounder included comments about our meeting with Bangla Desh, the one thing that would make the Chinese climb the walls. Al got Henry aside before the meeting, told him that and they gave Huang Hua another paper. I am not sure what it was about.

I also availed myself of the opportunity to explain to Huang Hua a newspaper article that appeared on December 10 quoting Ambassador Bush about the Secretary General. I explained to him that that was coming out of the press conference on December 8th not on the 9th. The article referred to "yesterday Ambassador Bush said" and it carried a December 10th dateline. I told him I didn't want him to think I had gone out of the meeting and openly violated the confidences that way. Huang Hua is very difficult. He doesn't say much in these secret meetings, possibly because he has no instructions. He smiles and is affable but the communication has been a one-way street. We are supplying him with a great deal of information, he is doing nothing. He asks

very few questions and his responses at this meeting were pure dogma. It was almost a repetition of what he said in the General Assembly and the Security Council meeting. He quoted a proverb about out of the darkness comes the sun, meaning don't worry. If East Pakistan gets wiped out, we can come back someplace else. In conclusion I worry about the system, about this two State Departments thing. I have no knowledge as to how thoroughly staffed out the Kissinger operation is. I understand the staff is big, but I don't know how those things work. Henry is very excitable, very emotional almost. He has a great sense of humor and sometimes is tremendously relaxed and buoyant. Often, however, he hits the ceiling and raises hell. I had a long talk with DePalma today who told me about some of their meetings in the Situation Room. Kissinger is absolutely brutal on these guys, insisting that they don't know anything and asking why they are screwing up policy etc. I went through that, and having had a little bit of a battle myself, I know what they are talking about. He is arrogant yet he can be charming. He is paranoid about the Department just as he was about the China vote, and yet he is very bright. I think he goes too far in some of these things. "We will support you in any resolution you propose." That is going very far indeed, it's going too far.

In my view we would be well to keep a fairly low profile, let Red China do what they had to do to counteract the Russian threat. It appears to me we might be moving in close cahoots with China or even on our own into more of a public position than I would like to see or is necessary for us.

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**Subject: YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 18. 1991 SHARING YOUR
EVALUATION OF THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BEING
CONDUCTED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT**

Date: 06-24-1983

To: CRISTIANI, ALFREDO

From: BUSH, GEORGE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED LETTER

RELEASED

For your clearance

(E3318)

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of April 18, 1991 sharing your evaluation of the peace negotiations being conducted by your government, the United Nations and the FMLN and inviting me to send a representative to the talks at the appropriate time. I continue to be very impressed by your good faith and flexibility in the talks and would like to reiterate that I wholeheartedly and firmly support your efforts to achieve peace. I agree with you that sending a representative of the U.S. Government to the talks to participate in a private meeting with the representatives of your Government, the United Nations and the FMLN would be useful, and I would very much like to continue in close contact with you to decide when the timing and circumstances would be most appropriate.

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations has been instructed to inform Secretary General Perez de Cuellar that we have consulted with you in formulating my response to his request that the U.S. Government attend the peace negotiations. The Secretary General has been informed that we are now prepared to undertake a direct meeting with representatives of the FMLN in the presence of representatives of the Salvadoran Government and the United Nations if there are reasonable assurances that this will contribute significantly to the conclusion of a political agreement and a cease-fire accord. We have made it

His Excellency
Alfredo Cristiani,
President of the Republic of El Salvador,
San Salvador.

United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: JOHNSTON, DONALD
Date: 06/13/94
Case ID: S940036G

clear to the Secretary General that the United States representative will not take a direct part in negotiations, which are the province of the Salvadoran Government. The Secretary General was also advised that we will continue to consult with you as to when you believe this meeting would most effectively contribute to an agreement.

Sincerely,

George Bush

**Subject: LETTER CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN CHILE
AND WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SET FORTH THE
ADMINISTRATIONS VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL
TRANSITION PROCESS IN THAT COUNTRY**

Date: 04-17-1985

To: KIRKLAND, LANE

From: BUSH, GEORGE

UNCLASSIFIED

KJ118A

STATE DEPARTMENT

SUGGESTED RESPONSE

Dear Mr. Kirkland:

Chile Project (#S199900030)

U.S. Department of State

Release ☒ Excise ☐ Deny ☐

In Full ☐

Exemption(s) ☐

I appreciate your letter of March 27 concerning the situation in Chile, and welcome this opportunity to set forth the Administration's views on the political transition process in that country.

Let me, at the outset, dispel any doubts about what this Administration wants in Chile or what we support. It is United States policy to support a return to democracy in Chile. The timing and modalities are matters to be decided by the Chilean people. We want the Chilean Government and the democratic political parties to reach agreement on a transition timetable. Our active diplomatic efforts, including recent visits to Chile by ranking Administration officials, are aimed at encouraging all sides to sit down in direct discussions to forge such a consensus.

Mr. Lane Kirkland,

President,

American Federation of Labor and

Congress of Industrial Organizations,

815 Sixteenth Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C.

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-2-

President Reagan addressed our support for democracy in Chile in his annual Human Rights Day message on December 10, 1984. I most recently referred to our concerns about Chile in my February 28 remarks in Austin on democracy in Latin America. Other Administration officials have addressed this issue in recent statements to the Congress. I want to assure you that the Administration will use all appropriate occasions to continue voicing its support for democracy and improved human rights practices in Chile.

There are now only seven countries left in the hemisphere that are not democratic or heading in that direction: Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, Guyana, Suriname, Paraguay and Chile. With its long democratic tradition, Chile, more than most of these countries, does not belong on this list. A return to democracy will depend on the capacity of the Chileans themselves to resolve the differences that brought about the election of a non-democratic civilian government and the installation of a non-democratic military regime nearly twelve years ago. Democratic labor has a positive role to play in the process of prevailing over intolerance from both ends of the political spectrum, the non-democratic left and the totalitarian right.

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Over the last decade, through its association with the representative democratic labor organizations, the AFL-CIO has helped keep the flame of democracy alive in Chile. In the critical months ahead we look to these groups to help provide a solid foundation from which a renewed and reinvigorated democratic system will emerge.

I want you to know that the AFL-CIO and its associates in Chile have our full support in this endeavor.

Sincerely,

George Bush

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Date Printed: 07/24/1998

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CHANNEL: n/a

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PAGE 01 BEIJIN 27745 01 OF 02 210955Z
ACTION EAP-00

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	NSAE-00	PM-10	AIT-02	PA-01	USIE-00	SP-02	PRS-01
	DS-08	SPD-01	SCT-04	/040 W			

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P 210947Z NOV 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2670
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI
AMCONSUL CHENGDU POUCH
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SHENYANG

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, CH
SUBJECT: A STUDENT DEMONSTRATION OF SORTS IN TIANANMEN
SQUARE

REF.: (A) BEIJING 23263; (B) BEIJING 26824;

1. SUMMARY. ACTING IN RESPONSE TO AN ANONYMOUSLY
DISTRIBUTED FLYER CALL FOR DEMONSTRATIONS WITH AN ANTI-
JAPANESE THEME IN TIANMEN SQUARE NOVEMBER 20 TO CELE-
BRATE AN EXPECTED CHINESE VICTORY IN A NATIONALLY
TELEVISED SINO-JAPANESE VOLLEYBALL CONTEST, PERHAPS AS
MANY AS 4-500 STUDENTS GATHERED FOR A HALF-HEARTED
DEMONSTRATION, WITH MOST PARTICIPANTS APPARENTLY THERE
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TO WITNESS THE EVENT AS MUCH AS PARTICIPATE IN IT. THE
DEMONSTRATION WAS GENTLY DISPERSED SHORTLY AFTER IT
BEGAN BY POLICE. THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE
FLYER WAS DISTRIBUTED AND THE DEMONSTRATION OR ANIZED
ENSURED THAT THE PARTY WAS WELL AWARE OF IT AT AN EARLY
STAGE, AND YET APPARENTLY DID NOT ACT TO STOP IT.
SUSPICION, THEREFORE, IS STRONG OF COMMUNIST PARTY
COMPLICITY IN ORGANIZATION OF THE DEMONSTRATION ALTHOUGH
THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF OTHER POSSIBLE SPECULATIVE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT J. MARTENS

DATE/CASE ID: 25 NOV 1998 199502887

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CHANNEL: n/a

1:

EXPLANATIONS. WHATEVER THE EXPLANATION, THE DEMONSTRATION WILL SURELY CAUSE INCREASED UNCERTAINTY IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS, AND RAISED THE PROFILE OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND ANTI-JAPANESE ACTIVITY STILL FURTHER AS DECEMBER, ALREADY MARKED AS A MONTH OF STUDENT ACTIVITY IN COMMEMORATION OF ANTI-JAPANESE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE PAST DRAWS CLOSE. END SUMMARY.

2. AN AMERICAN TEACHING AT BEIJING UNIVERSITY (BEIDA) GAVE US A COPY OF A COMPUTER-PRINTED AND XEROXED FLYER WHICH WAS SLIPPED UNDER THE DOORS OF ALMOST EVERY DORM ROOM AT BEIDA LAST WEEKEND. HE SAID THAT AFTER THE FLYER WAS DISTRIBUTED, CAMPUS PARTY ORGANIZATIONS ORDERED ALL STUDENTS TO STAY IN THEIR ROOMS MONDAY NIGHT TO STUDY THIS DOCUMENT. STUDENTS WERE REPORTEDLY FORBIDDEN TO DISCUSS THE FLYER WITH FOREIGNERS. HE SAID THAT STUDENTS HE HAD TALKED WITH ABOUT THE FLYER -- SOME OF WHOM HAD BEEN ACTIVE IN THE SEPTEMBER DEMONSTRATIONS -- WERE PUZZLED BY THE FLYER AND DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO MAKE OF IT.

3. THE BROADSIDE LEADS OFF BY RECALLING THE JAPANESE "ECONOMIC INVASION" WHICH OCCASIONED THE "SEPTEMBER 18" DEMONSTRATIONS (REF A). IT CONTINUES THAT SINCE THE THIRD PLENUM OF 1979, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN

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SATISFACTORY AND SHOULD BE PURSUED. BUT, IT SAYS, "THERE ARE TIMES OF UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN EVERY SOCIETY WHEN CERTAIN PEOPLE LEAD WOLVES INDOORS AND GIVE WINGS TO TIGERS." DURING THE "ANTI-JAPANESE WAR," THE FLYER CONTINUES, "SUCH PEOPLE WERE CALLED TRAITORS." TODAY THESE PEOPLE, USING OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY REFORMS TO FURTHER PERSONAL INTERESTS, ARE "SUCKERS OF WORKER'S BLOOD" AND ONLY WHEN THEY ARE "ANNIHILATED" CAN THE ECONOMIC INVASION BE CONTROLLED. AT PRESENT, BECAUSE OF "UNEVEN" DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY RECTIFICATION AND AN "IRRESOLUTE" PARTY LEADERSHIP, A NUMBER OF THESE PEOPLE HAVE BECOME "PRINCES." (NOTE. THIS IS NOT ONLY A SWIPE AT UNNAMED SENIOR LEADERS BUT ALSO TOUCHES ON THE QUESTION OF THE PRIVILEGED CHILDREN OF LEADERS). THE DOCUMENT ADDS A LENGTHY PAEAN TO DEMOCRACY, AND ACIDLY OBSERVES THAT "DEMOCRACY IS THE GREATEST SPIRITUAL CIVILIZATION." THE DOCUMENT THEN URGES STUDENTS TO PRESERVE SECRECY, GET IN TOUCH WITH STUDENTS FROM OTHER SCHOOLS, AND PROCEED FROM PEOPLE'S UNIVERSITY (IN A BEIJING SUBURB NEAR BEIDA) BY ANY MEANS, INCLUDING COMMANDEERING VEHICLES, TO TIANANMEN SQUARE TO DEMONSTRATE AT THE CONCLUSION OF A NATIONALLY TELEVISED SINO-JAPANESE WOMEN'S VOLLEY BALL MATCH THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 20. IF THE DEMONSTRATION IS SUCCESSFUL, THE FLYER CLAIMED, "NEXT YEAR'S THIRTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS" (SIC) WILL HAVE TO PAY

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ATTENTION TO THE STUDENTS' VIEWS.

4. AS IT TURNED OUT, THE DEMONSTRATION WAS MUCH LESS
 DRAMATIC THAN THE FLYER. EMBOFFS, AT THE SQUARE THROUGH-
 OUT THE EVENING, OBSERVED THAT THERE WERE MANY SECURITY
 PERSONNEL IN THE AREA, BUT APPARENTLY NOT SOLELY IN
 CONNECTION WITH THE DEMONSTRATION (MALAYSIAN PRIME
 MINISTER MAHATHIR WAS ATTENDING A STATE BANQUET AT THE
 ADJACENT HALL OF THE PEOPLE). DEMONSTRATORS TURNED
 UP IN SMALL GROUPS, AMOUNTING EVENTUALLY TO PERHAPS

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ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 PM-10 AIT-02 PA-01 USIB-00 SP-02 PRS-01
DS-08 SPD-01 SCT-04 /040 W

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P 210947Z NOV 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2671
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI
AMCONSUL CHENGDU POUCH
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMCONSUL SHENYANG

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIJING 27745

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, CH

SUBJECT: A STUDENT DEMONSTRATION OF SORTS IN TIANANMEN

4-500 PEOPLE

ALMOST ON THE STROKE OF NINE O'CLOCK,
SEVERAL PEOPLE GOT UP ABOVE THE LEVEL OF THE CROWD,
AND QUICKLY SHOUTED A FEW SLOGANS IN SUPPORT OF THE
CHINESE VOLLEYBALL VICTORY. HOWEVER, THE CROWD DID
NOT RESPOND AND REMAINED GOOD-NATURED, SOME LAUGHING A
BIT AND MAKING COMMENTS ON THE SIDELINES. ONE SPEAKER
TRIED TO LEAD THE CROWD IN THE NATIONAL ANTHEM, BUT
PITCHED IT TOO HIGH, AND GOT ONLY A LAUGH AS A RESPONSE
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Date Printed: 07/24/1998

DOC_NUMBER: 85BEIJIN27745

CHANNEL: n/a

1:

FROM THE CROWD. AFTER ABOUT FIVE MINUTES, A POLICE JEEP FITTED WITH A LOUDSPEAKER BEGAN MOVING THROUGH THE CROWD, URGING IT TO DISPERSE. NO MORE SPEAKERS AROSE. -- THE CROWD DID NOT DISPERSE, BUT RATHER CONTINUED TO STAND AROUND, APPARENTLY WAITING FOR SOMETHING TO HAPPEN. AFTER ABOUT HALF AN HOUR, SMALL NUMBERS OF POLICE SPLIT THE CROWD IN TWO, AND GRADUALLY EDGED THE DEMONSTRATORS OFF THE SQUARE AND INTO SURROUNDING STREETS. AT THIS POINT THE CROWD, CHILLED BY THE NIGHT AIR, DISPERSED. MEMBERS OF THE CROWD WERE RELUCTANT TO SPEAK WITH FOREIGNERS; MOST SEEMED TO BE OF COLLEGE AGE. PEOPLE'S UNIVERSITY AND QINGHUA UNIVERSITY WERE REPRESENTED BY EMBOFFS DID NOT ENCOUNTER ANY STUDENTS FROM BEIJING UNIVERSITY.

5. COMMENT. IT IS HARD TO PIN DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS AFFAIR AT THIS POINT. THE FLYER IS NOT VERY COMPLIMENTARY TOWARD THE COMMUNIST PARTY, YET THE AUTHORITIES, WHO CLEARLY KNEW ABOUT THE CALL FOR A DEMONSTRATION IN ADVANCE AND LET IT PROCEED. THE FIRST EXPLANATION THAT SPRINGS TO MIND IS THAT SOMEONE WANTED TO STIR UP TROUBLE TO EMBARRASS THE AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, THE SEMI-HOLIDAY ATMOSPHERE AMONG THE STUDENTS AT THE SQUARE, WHO SEEMED TO BE THERE MOSTLY TO GAWK, POINTS TO A LACK OF FEAR OF RETRIBUTION. THUS SOME OFFICIAL BLESSING -- OR AT LEAST ACQUIESCENCE -- MAY HAVE BEEN BESTOWED. WHATEVER THE EXPLANATION, THE PARTY'S AMBIGUOUS ROLE IN THE DEMONSTRATION IS CERTAIN TO CREATE FURTHER UNEASE IN THE SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP. THE DEMONSTRATION SERVED TO HEIGHTEN THE PROFILE OF STUDENT ACTIVITY AS DECEMBER, ALREADY MARKED AS A MONTH OF STUDENT ANTI-JAPANESE ACTIVITY (REF B), DRAWS CLOSE. LORD.

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BEIJIN 27745 02 OF 02 210955Z

**Subject: LE RE: I AM REPLYING TO YOUR TELEGRAM OF
NOVEMBER 3 TO PRESIDENT REAGAN MIROSLAV**

Date: 12-27-1985

To: SAVARYN, PETRO

From: BUSH, GEORGE

E235D
R



United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

DEC 27 1955

9303906

Dr. Petro Savaryn, President
World Congress of Free Ukrainians
2118A Bloor Street, West
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M6S 1M8

Dear Dr. Savaryn:

I am replying to your telegram of November 3 to President Reagan regarding Soviet Seaman Miroslav Medvid. I regret the delay in this response.

From the first moment the Department of State was informed of this case, we were determined to provide Seaman Medvid an opportunity to decide freely whether he wished to remain in the United States or return to the Soviet Union. Over several days, we took extraordinary measures to ensure that Seaman Medvid was interviewed in a neutral, non-threatening environment under our control, first aboard the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Salvia and again at a U.S. Navy shore facility.

In our questioning of Seaman Medvid, he repeatedly expressed his desire to return to the Soviet Union. The U.S. military doctors who examined him had no doubt as to his ability to make such a decision. All officials involved, both in Washington and New Orleans, concurred the United States should allow Seaman Medvid to return to the Soviet ship.

We were obviously unable to recreate Seaman Medvid's original frame of mind on October 24. We will never know what pressures may have been exerted on Seaman Medvid while he was on the Soviet ship, nor did we ever discount the fact such pressures may have influenced his final decision. We are under no illusions about the repressive nature of the Soviet Government and its willingness to use coercion and threats to control its citizens. There was always the possibility Seaman Medvid would wish to return to the Soviet Union and we would have to respect that choice, recognizing in cases such as this, only the individual involved can truly weigh the risks taken for himself or for others. The U.S. Government cannot and should not do this for him.

Sincerely yours,

George B. High
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Public Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN/PS/CR/IR Date: 3/17/97
CLASSIFY
EXCISE
DENY
EO Citations
IN PART

TS authority to
CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

COMIPAC HONOLULU HI 022209Z JAN 87

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ ~~UNINT~~

SUBJ: IPAC DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 1-87 {U}

{DIPS REC. I.D. PN 001} {U}

{U} INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MAY BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE USERS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION AND NEED TO KNOW. REQUESTS TO RELEASE/DISCLOSE ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SUMMARY TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO COMIPAC FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY.

{U} FORWARD WITHOUT SERVICE. INFORMATION PERISHABLE.

/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-

{U} THE SECURE TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR IPAC ANALYSTS IS 6223, UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.

/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-

{U} THIS SUMMARY CONTAINS FOUR ITEMS:

{1} {C/NF} CHINA

{2} {C/NF}

{3} {C/NF}

{4} {S/NF/WN}

/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-

{1} {C/NF} CHINA: STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS

{C/NF} IN BEIJING, APPROXIMATELY 3,000 STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS TOOK PART IN A NEW YEAR'S DAY PROTEST ADJACENT TO TIANANMEN SQUARE IN DEFIANCE OF A GOVERNMENT BAN. THE POORLY ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATORS WERE QUICKLY CONSTRAINED BY POLICE. SOME 24 "TROUBLEMAKERS" REPORTEDLY WERE TAKEN AWAY BY THE POLICE FOR "EDUCATION AND EXAMINATION."

{C/NF} LATER IN THE EVENING, 4,000 STUDENTS MARCHED FROM BEIJING UNIVERSITY TOWARD TIANANMEN SQUARE TO DEMAND THE RELEASE OF THEIR FELLOW STUDENTS. ABOUT THREE HOURS INTO THE 15-KM MARCH, 3,000 OF THEM RETURNED TO THE SCHOOL WHEN THEY WERE INFORMED THE DETAINED STUDENTS HAD BEEN FREED. THOSE WHO CONTINUED TO THE SQUARE WERE ADDRESSED BY A JUST-RELEASED STUDENT, AFTER WHICH THEY WENT BACK TO THEIR CAMPUS.

/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-

{2} {C/NF}

Subject: LETTER RE PEACE BRIGADES INTERNATIONAL IN EL
SALVADOR

Date: 09-16-1987

To: BOB

From: BUSH, GEORGE

EXCISE

E29A
P
B6

Suggested State Reply:

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of August 27, in which you discussed your current activities and requested advice on the establishment of Peace Brigades International (PBI) operations in El Salvador.

I was interested to hear of your work and of the plight of [redacted] who was arrested and deported from El Salvador. The arrest of [redacted] points up one of the problems of PBI-type activities by foreigners overseas. According to information provided by the Department of State, it is illegal under Salvadoran law for foreign citizens to become involved in internal politics. Similar laws are in effect in many other countries. In El Salvador, such involvement is a violation of the foreign citizen's visa status, a deportable offense, under Salvadoran immigration regulations. A Department of State travel advisory on El Salvador warns U.S. citizens of this fact.

B6
B6

[redacted] B6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9300620		IS/FPC/CDR Hewitt Date: 8/23/96	
<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations:	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority to:	
FOIA Exemptions: B6		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or	
PA Exemptions:		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or	

- 2 -

Despite PBI's laudable dedication to non-violent methods of civic action, the teaching of non-violent civil disobedience by foreign citizens to Salvadoran political organizations would logically be viewed as interference in internal politics. I would like, as well, that El Salvador currently enjoys full civil liberties under a democratically elected constitutional government. There is no prohibition against peaceful demonstrations which, in fact, occur on a regular basis.

The current political climate in El Salvador requires particular caution. According to the Department of State, it is a well-documented fact that several ostensible human rights and labor organizations have been thoroughly infiltrated by members of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the umbrella organization of five Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups. The infiltrated groups, which are now actually controlled by the FMLN, include the "Committee of Mothers of the Disappeared" (COMADRES), the National Refugee Coordinator (CNR), the Committee of the Displaced (CRIPDES), the non-government human rights commission (CDHES), and the Unity of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) and most of its affiliate organizations. If PBI works with any of these groups, it will inadvertently be assisting those who espouse the violent overthrow of the elected Government of El Salvador. I am sure you will wish to avoid such associations and the damage they could do to PBI's credibility as an apolitical organization which champions non-violence.

- 3 -

You did not mention whether or not FBI conducts programs in Nicaragua. Although, I am sure that the Sandinista Government would not look kindly upon the advocacy of individual civil liberties, non-violent or otherwise, the lack of basic freedoms and constitutional guarantees there would seem to make it an appropriate location for your programs.

When you travel to Central America, I urge you to contact our Embassies in El Salvador and Nicaragua to arrange for a briefing on the political situations in those countries. Our Embassies can also advise you on how to avoid further incidents such as that which [redacted] experienced. B6

Sincerely,

George Bush

Subject: TELEGRAM CONCERNING THE CASE OF ORLANDO
BOSCH

Date: 06-01-1988

To: CRUZ, RENE

From: BUSH, GEORGE

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNCLASSIFIED

SUGGESTED REPLY

E204B

R

Dear Mr. Cruz:

Thank you for your telegram concerning the case of Orlando Bosch. As you know, the United States Government has taken a firm stand against all forms of terrorism, including that sponsored by governments such as Cuba.

Since the case of Bosch is currently undergoing legal review by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the U.S. Department of Justice, and by U.S. courts, it would be inappropriate for me to comment on this case at this time.

Sincerely yours,

George Bush

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

9308099

ISFPC/CPK

Date: 4/26/76

(V) REVIEW () DECLASSIFY
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FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

EO Citations
TS authority to:
() CLASSIFY as () S or
() DOWNGRADE IS to () S or

Mr. Rene Cruz,
President,
World Federation of Cuban Former
Political Prisoners,
P. O. Box 638,
Huntington Park, California 90255

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: TELEGRAM CONCERNING THE CASE OF ORLANDO
BOSCH

Date: 06-01-1988

To: RODRIGUEZ, MARIO

From: BUSH, GEORGE

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REPLY

R

Dear Mr. Rodriguez:

Thank you for your telegram concerning the case of Orlando Bosch. As you know, the United States Government has taken a firm stand against all forms of terrorism, including that sponsored by governments such as Cuba.

Since the case of Bosch is currently undergoing legal review by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the U.S. Department of Justice, and by U.S. courts, it would be inappropriate for me to comment on this case at this time.

Sincerely yours,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9302099 IS/FPC/CDR R Date: 4/26/96

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PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or

Mr. Mario Rodriguez,
Secretary,
National Association of Professional Journalists,
250 46th Street,
Union City, New Jersey 07087

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Date Printed: 10/07/1998

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CHANNEL: n/a

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PAGE 01 BEIJIN 03421 01 OF 06 060956Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0557
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SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIJING 03421
DECAPTIONED
EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR STEVE STUDDERT AND JOHN KELLER

STATE FOR A/TSS JEANNIE BULL

STATE FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US
SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS
REGARDING WHAT WE AND THE CHINESE HOPE TO
ACCOMPLISH

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF A SERIES OF EMBASSY
ASSESSMENTS TRANSMITTED TO ASSIST WASHINGTON
PREPARATIONS FOR PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO CHINA.
3. THE EMBASSY SUBMITS THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS
REGARDING WHAT WE AND THE CHINESE HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH
DURING THE PRESIDENT'S FEBRUARY 25-27 VISIT TO CHINA.
THE MATERIAL IS BROKEN OUT INTO GENERAL GOALS AND
SPECIFIC TOPICS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL AND
BILATERAL ISSUES:

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I. A. WHAT THE U.S. WANTS FROM THE VISIT

-- PROVIDE SYMBOLISM OF CONTINUITY IN A HEALTHY,
STILL DEVELOPING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP; REINFORCE
POSITIVE MOMENTUM AS THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION BEGINS,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE Page - 1
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT J. MARTENS
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAR 1999 199802757

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SETTING THE TONE AND FRAMEWORK FOR THE AGENDA OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS.

-- DEEPEN PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH OLDER AND YOUNGER GENERATION OF CHINA'S LEADERS DURING POLITICAL SUCCESSION PHASE IN CHINA.

-- DEMONSTRATE CONTINUING HIGH PROFILE OF U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS, EVEN AS PRC MOVES FINALLY TO "NORMALIZE" RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WITH MID-MAY SUMMIT.

-- SHARE ASSESSMENTS AT HIGHEST LEVEL OF EACH SIDE'S VIEW OF ITS OWN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS.

-- LAUNCH A MORE CONCRETE DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE WITH THE CHINESE COVERING PRC PARTICIPATION IN BALLISTIC MISSILE, CHEMICAL AND NON-PROLIFERATION AREAS.

-- HIGHLIGHT BILATERAL ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL ACHIEVEMENTS AS CONCRETE MANIFESTATIONS OF OUR STRENGTHENING TIES.

-- SET FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLUTION OF BILATERAL ECON/COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS AT A TIME CHINA IS ASSUMING AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC

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COMMUNITY.

I. B. SPECIFIC U.S. OBJECTIVES/POINTS TO RAISE:

1) INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

A) THE SOVIET UNION

-- OBTAIN CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE DIRECTION OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

-- OBTAIN CHINESE ASSURANCES THAT SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL NOT UPSET THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, I.E., THAT THE EMERGING SINO-SOVIET DIALOGUE WILL

Q
&Q" T UNDERCUT U.S. INTERESTS.

-- SHARE WITH CHINESE OUR ASSESSMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS; ASSURE CHINESE THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WILL NOT AFFECT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PRC.

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-- ELICIT CHINESE ASSESSMENTS OF GORBACHEV'S POSITION,
LIKELY SOVIET DIRECTION IN FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC
REFORMS IN UPCOMING YEARS.

B) BALLISTIC MISSILES

--SEEK REAFFIRMATION OF CHINESE ASSURANCES THAT PRC
WILL NOT SELL INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES TO
COUNTRIES OTHER THAN SAUDI ARABIA. MENTION OUR
IMMEDIATE CONCERN ABOUT PAKISTAN.

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WHITEHOUS; WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECTION 02 OF 06 BEIJING 03421

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR STEVE STUDDERT AND JOHN KELLER

STATE FOR A/TSS JEANNIE BULL

STATE FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US

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Date Printed: 10/07/1998

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SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS

--SEEK, AS POSSIBLE, AN EXPLICIT CHINESE STATEMENT THAT THESE ASSURANCES APPLY TO ALL MISSILES WITH A RANGE GREATER THAN 300KMS.

--URGE CHINESE ASSOCIATION WITH MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO CONTAIN MISSILE PROLIFERATION.

C) ARMS CONTROL

--SUGGEST INTENSIFICATION OF OUR ONGOING DIALOGUE ON ARMS CONTROL THROUGH THE ANNUAL ACDA-MFA TALKS AND THE NEWLY INITIATED POLITICO-MILITARY TALKS.

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--SEEK AGREEMENT ON CONTINUED EXCELLENT COOPERATION WITH CHINA IN GENEVA IN BRINGING A COMPREHENSIVE, VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS INTO BEING WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

D) NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

--DISCUSS OUR ONGOING CONCERNS REGARDING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WITH THE ACCENT ON SOUTH ASIA.

--REPEAT OUR CONCERN AND ASK FOR ASSURANCES CONCERNING CHINA'S INTENTIONS RE PAKISTAN IN THE NUCLEAR AREAS.

E. AFGHANISTAN

--DESCRIBE THE KEY ROLE SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATION PLAYED IN FORCING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN.

---SEEK AUTHORITATIVE CHINESE VIEWS ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO ENSURE AFGHAN STABILITY, INDEPENDENCE, NEUTRALITY AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

F. CAMBODIA

--AGREE ON THE NEED FOR CONTINUED COOPERATION AND CLOSE CONSULTATION IN ACHIEVING SHARED GOALS IN CAMBODIA AS THE MULTILATERAL DIPLOMATIC PROCESS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AND COMPLEX.

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--REITERATE THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT NORMALIZE

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RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM UNTIL ALL VIETNAMESE TROOPS
HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM CAMBODIA IN THE CONTEXT OF AN
ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

--ELICIT AUTHORITATIVE CHINESE VIEWS ON THE PROGRESS
OF THEIR TALKS WITH THE VIETNAMESE AND THE SOVIETS
ON CAMBODIA, INCLUDING CLARIFICATION OF WHEN
CHINA WILL BEGIN REDUCING AID TO THE KHMER ROUGE.

--SEEK SPECIFIC CHINESE ASSURANCES THAT, IN THE
EVENT OF A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT, CHINA WOULD ENSURE
THAT THE WORST OF THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERS WILL
NOT REMAIN IN CAMBODIA.

--PROJECT U.S. SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK, INCLUDING
POSSIBLY BY ARRANGING A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT
AND SIHANOUK.

--PRESS THE CHINESE ON THEIR VIEWS OF AN INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND OTHER MEASURES TO PREVENT
KHMER ROUGE DOMINATION.

G. KOREA

-- DEEPEN DIALOGUE WITH SENIOR CHINESE LEADERS IN SHARED
EFFORT TO DRAW PYONGYANG OUT OF ISOLATION AND PROMOTE
CONTINUED PROGRESS IN THE ONGOING NORTH-SOUTH
DIALOGUE.

-- EXPRESS SATISFACTION WITH CHINA'S INCREASED CONTACT
WITH SOUTH KOREA.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0559
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECTION 03 OF 06 BEIJING 03421

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR STEVE STUDDERT AND JOHN KELLER

STATE FOR A/TSS JEANNIE BULL

STATE FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US
SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS

-- THANK THE CHINESE FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING
OUR TWO MEETINGS IN BEIJING WITH DPRK EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

H. JAPAN

-- NOTE THAT THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE PROVIDES TOKYO
WITH A SENSE OF SECURITY WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO
PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION.

-- EMPHASIZE US-JAPAN MILITARY COOPERATION IS
GEARED STRICTLY TOWARD JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE;
WHILE WE BELIEVE JAPAN COULD AND SHOULD DO MORE
IN TERMS OF SHOULDERING MORE OF ITS SELF-DEFENSE

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BURDEN, BOTH WE AND JAPANESE ARE AGAINST A MILITARY
POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY FOR JAPAN.

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I. MIDDLE EAST

--EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR CHINA'S EFFORTS IN URGING PLO TO PLAY MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND POSITIVE ROLE IN PEACE PROCESS.

--WELCOME CHINA'S RECENT DECISION TO MAINTAIN DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL THROUGH THE PRC UN MISSION IN NEW YORK.

--ENCOURAGE CHINA TO CONTINUE IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, NOTING THAT THIS IS ESSENTIAL IF CHINA WISHES TO BE RELEVANT TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS.

J. SOUTH ASIA

-- SHARE ASSESSMENTS OF TRENDS IN THE SUBCONTINENT.

-- URGE CHINESE INPUT INTO ACCELERATING INDO-PAK NORMALIZATION, INCLUDING THROUGH SINO-INDIAN NORMALIZATION, AND THROUGH FOREBEARANCE IN CHINESE NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN AND MISSILE SALES IN THE REGION.

-- PROBE CHINESE VIEWS ON HOW WE COULD COOPERATE TO DISCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA.

K. UNITED NATIONS

PAGE 03 BEIJIN 03421 03 OF 06 060957Z

--NOTE EXCELLENT COOPERATION WITH CHINA DURING MOST RECENT UNGA ON HIGH PRIORITY ISSUES, INCLUDING: RETURN OF THE KOREA ISSUE TO THE UNGA AGENDA, MAKING POSSIBLE THE FIRST-EVER SPEECH TO THE GA BY A SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT, THE SUCCESSFUL ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASEFIRE IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, AGREEMENT ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AND NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE, AND LIMITATION OF THE SIZE AND COST OF UNTAG.

--NOTE DIFFERENCES STILL REMAIN; FOR EXAMPLE, WE WERE VERY DISAPPOINTED BY CHINESE SUPPORT OF NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
CRITICISM OF OUR DOWNING OF LIBYAN
JETS IN SELF-DEFENSE OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

2) BILATERAL ISSUES

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A) ECONOMIC REFORM

-- OBTAIN ASSESSMENT FROM CHINA'S LEADERS OF NATURE,
PACE AND PROGNOSIS OF ECONOMIC REFORM

-- SUPPORT FURTHER REFORMS AND POINT OUT THAT THEY ARE
NECESSARY AND CONSISTENT WITH CHINA'S ASSUMING LARGER
WORLD ECONOMIC ROLE.

-
B) GATT

--REITERATE STRONG SUPPORT FOR CHINA'S ACCESSION TO
GATT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH CHINA ACCEPTS AND
IMPLEMENTS THE RESPONSIBILITIES SUCH MEMBERSHIP

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STATE FOR A/TSS JEANNIE BULL

STATE FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS

ENTAILS.

C) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

--STRESS CONCERN THAT THIS ISSUE IF NOT ADDRESSED
COULD BECOME A BILATERAL POLITICAL AS WELL AS
ECONOMIC SOURCE OF FRICTION. TRADE BILL SANCTIONS
MAY RESULT IF CHINA DOES NOT DEVELOP ADEQUATE IPR
PROTECTION LEGISLATION AND PROPER ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISM. WE STAND PREPARED TO WORK EVEN MORE
CLOSELY WITH CHINA TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

D) TRADE AND INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT

PAGE 02 BEIJIN 03421 04 OF 06 060958Z

--HIGHLIGHT DRAMATIC RISE IN BILATERAL TRADE AND
U.S. INVESTMENT IN CHINA IN 1988 AS INDICATIVE OF
OUR STRENGTHENED TIES.

--STRESS IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING GROWING NUMBER OF
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES TO AVOID DAMAGING
CHINA'S ATTRACTIVENESS TO THE U.S. BUSINESS
COMMUNITY. (SOME ILLUSTRATIVE CASES MAY BE RAISED.)

E) CIVIL AVIATION

--EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR POSITIVE CONCLUSION TO CURRENT
CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

--NOTE OUR READINESS TO WORK WITH CHINA TO ENHANCE
AVIATION SECURITY AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL.

F) DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

--ENCOURAGE CONTINUED CONTACT AND COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE U.S.
AND CHINA.

--ENCOURAGE CHINA'S DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT TO BECOME
MORE AWARE OF CHINA'S RESPONSIBILITIES AS A REGIONAL

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AND WORLD ACTOR, PARTICULARLY IN SALES OF ARMS,
MISSILES, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPON COMPONENTS.

G) HUMAN RIGHTS/TIBET

--NOTE THAT CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WILL CONTINUE
TO BE A FACTOR IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND WILL
INFLUENCE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

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--MAKE CLEAR TO THE CHINESE THAT WE WILL CONTINUE
TO WATCH CAREFULLY SUCH ISSUES AS TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS IN TIBET, FAMILY PLANNING PRACTICES, AND
THE TREATMENT OF DISSIDENTS.

--SEEK CHINESE AGREEMENT TO A REGULAR CHANNEL FOR
INFORMATION ON TIBETAN PRISONERS.

--SEEK MORE CONCRETE ASSURANCES ON PRESS ACCESS TO
TIBET.

--ELICIT CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL
RAMIFICATIONS FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF THE PANCHEN
LAMA AND PROSPECTS FOR PRC-DALAI LAMA TALKS.

H) EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

--ENCOURAGE FURTHER EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENTAL AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL AND ATHLETIC
EXCHANGES.

--EXPRESS U.S. SATISFACTION WITH AGREEMENT ON
ARRIVAL THIS YEAR OF THE FIRST PEACE CORPS CONTINGENT.

I) LAW ENFORCEMENT

--ENCOURAGE GREATER BILATERAL EXCHANGE IN ORDER TO
ENHANCE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF CREATING A CADRE OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS WHO WILL BE ADVOCATES
FOR POSITIVE CHANGE WITHIN THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM.

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WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECTION 05 OF 06 BEIJING 03421

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR STEVE STUDDERT AND JOHN KELLER

STATE FOR A/TSS JEANNIE BULL

STATE FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US
SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS

--PROPOSE THAT A VISIT BY THE DEA ADMINISTRATOR BE
RESCHEDULED FOR 1989.

--PROPOSE THAT OUR AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM VISIT BEIJING IN THE NEAR FUTURE
TO DISCUSS JOINT EFFORTS TO TRACK AND
COUNTER REGIONAL AND GLOBAL TERRORISM.

II. A. WHAT THE CHINESE HOPE TO GAIN FROM THE
PRESIDENTIAL VISIT

-- CONFIRM HEALTHY AND IMPROVING SINO-AMERICAN

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DOC_NUMBER: 89BEIJIN03421

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RELATIONS FOR U.S., PRC AND WORLD AUDIENCE.

-- BRING TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTENTION CHINA'S VIEWS AND BILATERAL COMPLAINTS WHILE THE NEW TEAM IS STILL FORMULATING ITS FOREIGN POLICY.

-- PROVIDE BALANCE AND POSSIBLY SOME LEVERAGE VIS-A-VIS THE PARADE OF SOVIETS AND VIETNAMESE WHO WILL BE COMING TO BEIJING DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

-- OBTAIN U.S. ASSESSMENT OF US-SOVIET TIES, INTERNAL SOVIET SITUATION.

--PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR TOP LEADERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO COORDINATE ON FAST-BREAKING DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMBODIA, KOREA AND AFGHANISTAN. ENCOURAGE US-DPRK TIES, SEEK REAFFIRMATION OF TOUGH U.S. STAND ON CAMBODIA.

-- EASING OF U.S. RESTRICTION REGARDING STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS, IMPORT QUOTAS, ANTI-DUMPING PROVISIONS, LACK OF UNCONDITIONAL MFN AND GSP, AND U.S. FIVE POINTS ON GATT ACCESSION.

-- STRESS STRONGLY-HELD BELIEF THAT U.S., DESPITE STATEMENTS CITING CHINA AS A FRIENDLY COUNTRY DOES NOT TREAT CHINA, ACCORDINGLY IN BILATERAL ECONOMIC TIES.

-- AT OUTSET OF BUSH ADMINISTRATION, GET AN AUTHORITATIVE U.S. STATEMENT OF "ONE CHINA" POLICY AND AMERICAN DISSOCIATION FROM PRO-INDEPENDENCE

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SENTIMENT ON TAIWAN.

II. B. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES/POINTS THAT THE CHINESE MAY RAISE:

1) INTERNATIONAL

THE SOVIET UNION

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-- REASSURE U.S. IN GENERAL TERMS THAT RELATIONS WITH
THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE CERTAIN LIMITS AND WILL NOT
AFFECT RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

-- PROVIDE ASSESSMENT OF UPCOMING SINO-SOVIET SUMMIT.

-- ELICIT U.S. IMPRESSIONS ON WHERE AND HOW FAST WE ARE
GOING WITH THE SOVIETS IN US-SOVIET TIES, INCLUDING IN
DISARMAMENT AREAS, U.S. ANALYSES OF GORBACHEV'S
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS.

CAMBODIA

-- SEEK ASSURANCES THAT U.S. INTENDS TO KEEP UP
ITS PRESSURE ON VIETNAM TO WITHDRAW FROM CAMBODIA. DRAW
THE U.S. INTO THE PRC EFFORT TO UNDERCUT VN-SOVIET
EFFORT TO LEGITIMIZE HUN SEN REGIME.

-- DRIVE HOME THAT CHINESE GOALS IN CAMBODIA HAVE

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STATE FOR A/TSS JEANNIE BULL

STATE FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECON, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE H.W.), CH, US

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA: SUGGESTIONS

NOT CHANGED, DESPITE RECENT PROGRESS IN SINO-SOVIET
RELATIONS AND SOME MOVEMENT IN SINO-VIETNAMESE
RELATIONS.

-- MAINTAIN AMBIGUITY ON CHINESE INTENTIONS REGARDING
DISPOSITION OF THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERSHIP.

-

2) BILATERAL

A) TAIWAN

-- PROBE FOR INDICATIONS THAT THE NEW BUSH ADMINISTRATION
WILL BE RECEPTIVE TO PRC PRESSURES AIMED AT DISASSOCI-
ATING THE U.S. FROM TAIWAN.

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-- POSSIBLY LAY DOWN MARKER OF CONTINUED DISPLEASURE
WITH QUANTITY, QUALITY AND RATE OF REDUCTION OF U.S.
ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

-- ELICIT A U.S. STATEMENT OF OPPOSITION TO PRO-
INDEPENDENCE SENTIMENT ON TAIWAN.

-- REITERATE THAT U.S. SHOULD PLAY A ROLE IN
ENCOURAGING KMT TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT TALKS WITH THE
CCP.

-- ENCOURAGE U.S. OPPOSITION TO TAIWAN'S EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY, E.G., GATT
ENTRY BEFORE CHINA.

B) "INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS":

-- REGISTER CONCERN WITH U.S. ACTIONS PERCEIVED AS
INTERFERENCE IN PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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-- SEEK, IF POSSIBLE, THE FOLLOWING FROM U.S.:

- REAFFIRMATION OF U.S. RECOGNITION OF
- CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER TIBET
- PLEDGE TO SUPPORT THE NEW UNFPA PROGRAM
- FOR CHINA
- ADMINISTRATION COMMITMENT TO RESTRAIN FROM
- COMMENT ON CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS
-

C) EXPORT CONTROLS

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--PRESS FOR MAJOR RELAXATION OF U.S. AND
COCOM STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS ON CHINA.

D) GATT

-- SEEK U.S. SUPPORT FOR PRC'S SPEEDY GATT ENTRY WITHQ
ONLY PREREQUISITE BEING TARIFF REDUCTIONS.

-- REQUEST UNCONDITIONAL MFN AND GSP FOLLOWING GATT
ENTRY.

E) BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY

-- PRESS FOR U.S. TO FOLLOW JAPAN'S EXAMPLE LAST YEAR
IN SIGNING AN INVESTMENT TREATY.

F) SOFT LOANS

-- STRESS THAT U.S. FOLLOW OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES'
LEAD IN THIS AREA.
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TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC//DA/DAH-3// PRIORITY

SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 03657

WHITE HOUSE FOR STEVE STUDDERT AND JOHN KELLER

STATE FOR A/TSS JEANNIE BULL

STATE ALSO FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS AND P/M LEHOVICH

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), CH, .PREL, MARR

SUBJECT: U.S.-PRC MILITARY RELATIONSHIP -- ON THE EVE
OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT

1. -- ENTIRE TEXT

2. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY

- CHINA HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK TO THE U.S.,
AMONG WESTERN NATIONS, TO SUPPORT ITS MILITARY
MODERNIZATION EFFORTS. CONSERVATIVE AND IDEOLOGICAL
ELEMENTS WITHIN THE CHINESE HIERARCHY TENDED TO ACT AS
A BRAKE ON MILITARY-TO-MILITARY PROGRESS DURING THE
EARLY AND MID-1980'S; IN LATE 1987, THE U.S. BASICALLY

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PLACED THE RELATIONSHIP ON HOLD FOR SEVERAL MONTHS
BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERN OVER THE SILKWORM MISSILE SALES
TO IRAN PROBLEM. NONETHELESS, SINCE 1986, PROGRESS HAS
BEEN SUBSTANTIAL. CHINESE RESTRAINT AND WILLINGNESS TO
CONDUCT CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON MISSILE SALES, HAS
PERMITTED SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT IN THE PAST YEAR. HIGH
LEVEL VISITS EACH WAY HAVE RESUMED; FUNCTIONAL AND

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT J. MARTENS
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAR 1999 199802757

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ACADEMIC EXCHANGES ARE MOVING FORWARD IN KEY AREAS; AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO CHINA ARE APPROACHING EIGHT HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS. FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SALES OF MILITARY-RELATED EQUIPMENT TO CHINA BY U.S. COMPANIES ARE INCREASING STEADILY. WHILE WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE THIS TREND FOR POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL REASONS, WE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO REVIEW ALL SALES CAREFULLY ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS TO ENSURE THEY DO NOT UPSET DELICATE POWER RELATIONSHIPS VIS-A-VIS ASEAN, JAPAN, AND TAIWAN. THE PRESIDENT'S KEY MEETINGS WILL BE WITH THE THREE TOP MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION (DENG, YANG AND ZHAO) PERHAPS THE SINGLE MOST POWERFUL UNIT IN CHINA. THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WILL REINFORCE THE IMPORTANT MILITARY DIMENSIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL SINO-U.S. RELATIONSHIP. OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVE IS TO BUILD ON AND ADVANCE THE SINO-AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP THAT EVOLVED DURING THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE WILL WANT TO MAINTAIN A GRADUAL PACE SO AS NOT TO BE PROVOCATIVE TO OUR ASIAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES. END BACKGROUND/SUMMARY

3. CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS

- MILITARY MODERNIZATION: CHINA'S STRATEGIC COURSE

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OF REDUCING TENSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES AROUND ITS PERIPHERY IS AIMED AT PERMITTING THE LUXURY OF LONG RANGE PLANNING AND REDUCED RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR DEFENSE, CONSISTENT WITH ITS INTERNAL MODERNIZATION DRIVE. THE PRC IS SEEKING TO FIELD AN ARMY ABLE TO FIGHT A WAR UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS BY THE END OF THE CENTURY. REALIZATION OF ITS GOAL WILL DEPEND TO A GREAT EXTENT ON A VIBRANT AND MUCH IMPROVED NATIONAL ECONOMY. SINCE 1978, SPENDING ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM HAS REMAINED THE LOWEST PRIORITY OF THE "FOUR MODERNIZATIONS." MILITARY UNITS ARE NOW REQUIRED TO EXPEND SOME OF THEIR OPERATIONAL RESOURCES IN THE PRODUCTION OF CIVILIAN COMMERCIAL ITEMS IN ORDER TO EARN AS MUCH AS THIRTY PERCENT OF THE MILITARY BUDGET. ARMS SALES ABROAD HAVE ALSO BECOME A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT SOURCE OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE NEEDED TO PURCHASE SELECTED ITEMS OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT. WE ESTIMATE THAT ARMS SALES ACCOUNT FOR ROUGHLY ANOTHER THIRTY PERCENT OF THE PLA'S BUDGET.

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- THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IS UNDERGOING A TRANSITION TO MUCH YOUNGER AND BETTER EDUCATED OFFICERS. THE MILITARY RECENTLY RETURNED TO A RANK SYSTEM ON THE FIRST OF OCTOBER, AND ACQUIRED NEW UNIFORMS AT THE SAME TIME. THE PLA IS PUTTING IN PLACE A CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM SIMILAR, IN MANY RESPECTS, TO OURS. IN ADDITION, THE CHINESE MILITARY CONTINUES TO SEEK FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO ADVANCE TECHNICALLY ITS INDIGENOUS MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITY SO AS TO PRODUCE MODERN

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TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0706
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC//DA/DAH-3// PRIORITY

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WHITE HOUSE FOR STEVE STUDDERT AND JOHN KELLER

STATE FOR A/TSS JEANNIE BULL

STATE ALSO FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS AND P/M LEHOVICH

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E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), CH, PREL, MARR

SUBJECT: U.S.-PRC MILITARY RELATIONSHIP -- ON THE EVE

WEAPONRY NECESSARY TO SUPPORT AN EVOLVING MODERN MILITARY DOCTRINE. THESE INITIATIVES AND OTHERS ADD UP TO VERY AMBITIOUS MILITARY REFORMS -- ALL OF WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF FISCAL AUSTERITY.

- CHINA'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN AN EMERGING ASSERTIVENESS AND A DRIVE FOR INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WHILE CHINA CONTINUES TO PURSUE AN "INDEPENDENT" FOREIGN POLICY LINE, IT IS DEPENDENT ON THE WEST, PARTICULARLY THE U.S., EUROPE, AND JAPAN, FOR THE CAPITAL, MARKETS AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY ESSENTIAL TO ITS OVERARCHING

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MODERNIZATION PRIORITIES, INCLUDING THE MILITARY. IN ASIA, WHERE THE CHINESE DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES AND WIELD MAJOR INFLUENCE, OUR POLICIES CONVERGE OR RUN PARALLEL ON MOST ISSUES.

4. MILITARY AND THE SUCCESSION

- AS DENG APPROACHES FULL RETIREMENT, HIS SUCCESSION BECOMES A TOPIC OF INCREASING IMPORTANCE. SUPPORT OF THE CHINESE MILITARY HISTORICALLY HAS BEEN A KEY DIMENSION OF THE SUCCESSION PROCESS AND THE ABILITY OF A "CHOSEN" SUCCESSOR TO RETAIN HIS GRIP ON THE REINS OF POWER. HU YAOBANG'S FALL WAS PARTLY DUE TO PLA OPPOSITION. ZHAO ZIYANG MAY NOT YET HAVE ESTABLISHED HIS CREDENTIALS WITHIN THE MILITARY AND MAYBE WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO DO SO, NOTWITHSTANDING HIS 1987 ELEVATION TO THE NUMBER TWO TITULAR POSITION IN THE CPC PARTY MILITARY COMMISSION. AT A RECENT CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION MEETING ZHAO ZIYANG WAS PLACED IN THE ROLE OF A CENTRAL PLAYER; HE AND DENG APPARENTLY REALIZING THAT BECAUSE ZHAO DOES NOT HAVE A STRONG MILITARY POWER BASE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONTINUALLY ATTEMPT TO FORGE INCREASING TIES BETWEEN ZHAO AND THE MILITARY. AS DENG FADES FROM THE SCENE, THE IMPORTANCE OF ATTAINING AND MAINTAINING TIES TO KEY MILITARY LEADERS BECOMES A SUBJECT OF INCREASED CONCERN AND EFFORT FOR THOSE WHO SEEK THE MANTLE OF INTERNAL POWER. AGING PRESIDENT YANG SHANGKUN (DE FACTO HEAD OF THE PLA AND FIRST PERMANENT VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE CPC MILITARY COMMISSION) WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE

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SUCCESSION PROCESS SHOULD DENG DIE BEFORE HIM. IT IS
IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. TO NURTURE CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS
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WITH THE MILITARY AS A KEY DIMENSION OF THE INTERNAL
POWER STRUCTURE. THE MILITARY ALSO SIGNIFICANTLY
INFLUENCES OR ARE STRATEGICALLY PLACED TO VETO CHINESE
POLICIES ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, INCLUDING STRATEGIC
ARMS, BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION.

5. SINO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONS

- THE RECENT VISIT OF SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE TO BEIJING AND PLANS FOR A VISIT BY
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV TO BEIJING IN MAY SYMBOLIZE
IMPROVING SINO-SOVIET POLITICAL RELATIONS. FOLLOWING
SEVEN YEARS OF GRADUAL GROWTH IN NON-POLITICAL/MILITARY
ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP (CULTURAL, ECONOMIC,
SCIENTIFIC), GORBACHEV'S ARRIVAL AS CPSU GENERAL
SECRETARY AS WELL AS PRESIDENT WILL SIGNAL MOVEMENT IN
PARTY TO PARTY TIES AS WELL. MILITARY RELATIONS WILL
PROBABLY BE THE LAST TO FOLLOW. MILITARY-TO-MILITARY
PROGRESS MOST LIKELY WILL BE MODEST, CERTAINLY NEVER
REACHING THE LEVEL OF MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE
1950'S. THERE CONTINUES TO BE RESIDUAL ILL-FEELING
WITHIN THE PLA TOWARDS THE SOVIET MILITARY.
ADDITIONALLY, THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS CHINA'S
PRINCIPAL FUTURE THREAT, HISTORICALLY, GEOGRAPHICALLY
AND GEOPOLITICALLY. THE PLA'S CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE
AND THE PRIMARY RATIONALE FOR ITS BUDGET REQUESTS ARE
TO COUNTER THAT THREAT. FOR THE CHINESE, A VERY CLOSE
RELATIONSHIP TO THE SOVIET MILITARY COULD HAVE SOME
SHORT TERM GAIN BUT WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL IN THE LONG
TERM. EASING TENSIONS AND REDUCING THE SOVIET THREAT

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TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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WHITE HOUSE FOR STEVE STUDDERT AND JOHN KELLER

STATE FOR A/TSS JEANNIE BULL

STATE ALSO FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS AND P/M LEHOVICH

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), CH, PREL, MARR
SUBJECT: U.S.-PRC MILITARY RELATIONSHIP -- ON THE EVE

PERMITS TIME TO LAY DOWN A MORE MODERN MILITARY,
ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

6. SINO-U.S. STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS

- THE GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF OUR MILITARY
RELATIONS WITH BEIJING REMAIN AN IMPORTANT UNDERPINNING
OF THE SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP AS A WHOLE. THE U.S.
AND CHINA BOTH ARE IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW.
NEVERTHELESS, CHINA CONTINUES TO LOOK TO US TO MAINTAIN
THE BASIC GLOBAL AND REGIONAL BALANCE, AND FOR US, A

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FRIENDLY CHINA HELPS TO CHECK THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET

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EXPANSIONISM. THE CHINESE ASSUME THAT WE ARE NOT CHINA'S PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC THREAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE U.S. AND CHINA BOTH SEEK THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM CAMBODIA AND AFGHANISTAN. WE SHARE A COMMON HOPE FOR PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE CHINESE TACITLY CONDONE OUR PACIFIC PRESENCE AS A FORCE FOR REGIONAL STABILITY, PARTICULARLY AS A CONTROLLING INFLUENCE VIS-A-VIS FUTURE JAPANESE MILITANCY. THEY AVOID EXPLICIT COMMENT ON OUR PHILIPPINE BASES WHILE QUIETLY SUPPORTING OUR CONTINUING PRESENCE IN THE REGION.

- BILATERAL DIFFERENCES. AGAINST THIS BROAD BACKDROP OF COOPERATION, SOURCES OF BILATERAL FRICTION REMAIN, INCLUDING POTENTIAL CHINESE MISSILE SALES, TAIWAN, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES GENERALLY, INCLUDING TIBET. SOME AMERICANS ALONG WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION VIEW WARILY CHINA'S EMERGENCE AS A MAJOR POWER AND ITS ATTEMPTS TO BUILD INFLUENCE AROUND THE WORLD. A POTENTIAL AREA OF FUTURE DISAGREEMENT IS THE SPRATLY ISLANDS WHERE PRC AMBITIONS COULD LEAD CHINA INTO CONFLICT NOT ONLY WITH VIETNAM BUT OUR ASEAN FRIENDS AS WELL.

7. THEMES FOR DISCUSSION DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT

A. U.S. THEMES

- 1) EMPHASIZE THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF A CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OUR TWO MILITARIES
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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WHICH ARE AN IMPORTANT MEANS FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS.

- 2) DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

--NOTE CHINA'S ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY AS A KEY WORLD ACTOR IN CURBING TENSIONS AND STRENGTHENING STABILITY, IN SALES OF ARMS, MISSILES, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPON COMPONENTS.

- 3) BALLISTIC MISSILES

--SEEK REAFFIRMATION OF CHINESE ASSURANCES THAT PRC WILL NOT SELL INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES TO COUNTRIES OTHER THAN SAUDI ARABIA. MENTION OUR IMMEDIATE CONCERN

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ABOUT PAKISTAN.

--SEEK, AS POSSIBLE, AN EXPLICIT CHINESE STATEMENT THAT
THESE ASSURANCES APPLY TO ALL MISSILES WITH A RANGE
GREATER THAN 300 KMS.

--URGE CHINESE ASSOCIATION WITH MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO
CONTAIN MISSILE PROLIFERATION.

- 4) ARMS CONTROL

--SUGGEST INTENSIFICATION OF OUR ONGOING DIALOGUE ON
ARMS CONTROL THROUGH THE ANNUAL ACDA-MFA TALKS AND THE
NEWLY INITIATED POLITICAL-MILITARY TALKS BETWEEN THE
FOREIGN MINISTRIES.

--SEEK AGREEMENT ON CONTINUED EXCELLENT COOPERATION

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WHITE HOUSE FOR STEVE STUDDERT AND JOHN KELLER

STATE FOR A/TSS JEANNIE BULL

STATE ALSO FOR EAP/CM WILLIAMS AND P/M LEHOVICH

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), CH, PREL, MARR

SUBJECT: U.S.-PRC MILITARY RELATIONSHIP -- ON THE EVE

WITH CHINA IN GENEVA IN BRINGING A COMPREHENSIVE,
VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS INTO BEING WITHIN A
SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

-

- 5) NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

--DISCUSS OUR ONGOING CONCERNS REGARDING NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION, WITH THE ACCENT ON SOUTH ASIA.

--REPEAT OUR CONCERN AND ASK FOR ASSURANCES CONCERNING
CHINA'S INTENTIONS RE PAKISTAN IN THE NUCLEAR AREAS.

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B. LIKELY CHINESE THEMES

- 1) CHINESE LEADERS MAY ASK ABOUT FURTHER
RELAXATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL CONTROLS FOR
MILITARY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. WE CAN NOTE PROGRESS ON
SPACE LAUNCH SERVICES SINCE SECRETARY CARLUCCI'S VISIT
AND HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING ON OTHER CHINESE INTERESTS
SUCH AS THE GE 404 ENGINE AND AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING
EQUIPMENT.

- 2) CHINESE LEADERS MAY ASSURE US THAT WHILE THE
THAW IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS MAY LEAD TO SOME EXPANDED
MILITARY CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS, THOSE CONTACTS
SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS THREATENING THE U.S. AND WILL
CERTAINLY BE DIFFERENT IN FORM AND CONTENT FROM THAT
WHICH EXISTED IN THE 1950'S. WE CAN ACCEPT THIS
ASSURANCE AND REGISTER OUR INTENTION IN TURN NOT TO
PERMIT IMPROVING U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS TO IMPAIR OUR
WITH TIES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

- 3) FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, WE HAVE
PERSISTENTLY RESISTED CHINESE REQUESTS FOR AN AIR
REFUELING AIRCRAFT. THE DECISION WAS PROBABLY MADE AT
THE HIGHEST LEVELS (DENG OR YANG) TO GO ALL OUT TO

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OBTAIN THE CAPABILITY. WE HAVE BEEN APPROACHED SEVERAL
TIMES AS HAVE OTHERS. THE UK HAS HAD A REQUEST TO SELL
A REFUELER AIRCRAFT TO CHINA STUCK IN COCOM FOR
MONTHS. THE JAPANESE HAVE BEEN STRONGLY AGAINST
APPROVAL. REFUELER AIRCRAFT REPRESENT A FUTURE POWER
PROJECTION CAPABILITY THAT THE JAPANESE, ASEAN AND
OTHERS WOULD BE FIRMLY AGAINST. LORD.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1989

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: Your China Visit February 25-27

I. SETTING

- o You return to China as President with our bilateral relationship fundamentally sound, reflecting our importance to China as a militarily strong, technologically advanced nation with whom China shares substantial common interests.
- o With US-PRC relations entering more mature, less dramatic phase, spotlight has shifted to Soviet success in achieving breakthrough toward normalizing Sino-Soviet relations. Gorbachev-Deng May summit could feed perception that strategic underpinning for US-China relationship is eroding, an impression both we and Chinese wish to counter.
- o PRC's arms export policies, unrest in Tibet, criticism in Congress, have ruffled bilateral relations. High level visits, frank dialogue, have helped contain problems. Beijing is unsettled about trends in Taiwan; the emphasis is shifting from criticism of US arms sales to need for greater US support in curbing separatist tendencies, fostering contacts. US-PRC economic cooperation strong. PRC looks to US for market access, advanced technology, investment, support in international economic forums such as GATT.
- o Domestically, Deng era drawing to close. Achieved remarkable success in restoring stability, accelerating development, expanding ties with outside world. But key tests in transition still to come. New pragmatic leaders in place but positions not yet consolidated. Ideology in tatters. Growth rate remains high, but pace of reform faltering, problems mounting.

II. OBJECTIVES

- o Lay foundation for continuing strong and growing China relationship as means of insuring that improving Sino-Soviet ties do not jeopardize fundamental US interests.
- o Reaffirm framework for US China policy, provide reassurance that US friendship for Taiwan will be pursued in consistent manner that promotes peaceful resolution of issue.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 22 DEC 1999 199802757

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- o Forge ties with China's new generation of leaders, while renewing old acquaintanceships.
- o Review key international issues: USSR, Cambodia, Korea, missile proliferation; lay basis for addressing future problems.

III. STRATEGY

- o Your early visit provides excellent opportunity to set agenda for developing relationship further, demonstrate US interest in sustained high-level dialogue.
- o Key purpose is to consolidate your personal ties with China's leaders, demonstrate strength of relationship, offset impression that Sino-Soviet rapprochement is at our expense. Chinese share these goals. Agreement on Peace Corps program, announcement of high level visits, would serve these purposes.
- o You will be welcomed both as President and old friend. China has moved deliberately with Soviet Union, forced Moscow to address its agenda, taken care to prevent Sino-Soviet normalization from jeopardizing its relationship with US which retains vital importance as counterbalance to USSR, key element for stability in East Asia, source of technology/investments.
- o Chinese will be looking for reassurance that our policy will remain firmly based on one China, the three communiques (Shanghai, normalization, August 17, 1982) and established groundrules in our handling of Taiwan issue. You may wish to address these concerns both in your private comments and public toast, conveying a strong signal of policy continuity.
- o Focus of bilateral discussions should be on concrete steps to enhance ties: e.g. active military exchanges and cooperation, measures to expand trade and investment, continued export control liberalization, reciprocal visits.
- o Review of global and regional issues should highlight areas where cooperation and/or mutual understanding essential, e.g. ties with Soviets, arms control, progress toward Cambodia settlement, lowering tensions in Korea.
- o At same time important to remind Chinese that our ability to expand relationship, sustain congressional and public support, depends on responsible handling of issues such as ballistic missile exports, nuclear proliferation, and human rights, especially Tibet.

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cleared: EAP:WClark *W*
:EAP:RLWilliams
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
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FOR ACTING AS CLARK AND AMB WILLIAMS FROM AMB LILLEY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TEXT

TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, CH

SUBJECT: PLA READY TO STRIKE

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AFTER BACKING AND FILLING LAST NIGHT AND TRYING TO THREATEN AND INTIMIDATE THE DEMONSTRATORS, WHICH WAS NOT WORKING, THE PLA NOW APPEARS READY TO STRIKE EARLY MORNING OF MAY 22. THE ANNOUNCEMENT ON CCTV AT SEVEN O'CLOCK THIS EVENING (SUNDAY, MAY 21) TOLD THE PEOPLE THE PLA WAS COMING IN TO DEFEND THEM AND CLEAN THINGS UP. WE NOW HAVE RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT 113 APC ARE AT MARCO POLO BRIDGE, THE 43RD AIRBORNE FROM KAIFENG, THE 24TH ARMY AND THE 27TH ARMY AS WELL AS THE 6TH TANK DIVISION ARE PREPARED TO MOVE IN ON TIANANMEN FROM THE NORTHWEST, SOUTHWEST, EAST AND WEST. THEY ARE NOW PREDICTED TO LAUNCH IN ABOUT TWO HOURS AND COULD BE DOWNTOWN EARLY IN THE MORNING OF MONDAY, MAY 22.

3. THERE ARE MASSES OF PEOPLE POURING OUT OF CENTER BEIJING IN TRUCKS, ON BICYCLES, AND ON FOOT, TO MEET THE INCOMING TROOPS. THE PEOPLE KNOW THEY ARE COMING AND WILL TRY TO INFLUENCE THEM NOT TO COME.

4. A CONFRONTATION RESULTING IN BLOODSHED IS PROBABLE AT THIS POINT. I HAVE CONTACTED MFA TO REGISTER MY CONCERNS. I HAVE ASKED TO SPEAK TO LIU HUAQIU, BUT WE HAVE NOT MADE CONTACT YET. THE DUTY OFFICER HAS TOLD US HE CANNOT GET THROUGH TO LIU. EARLIER A/DCM HAD EXPRESSED OUR CONCERNS TO MFA AND HAD BEEN TOLD THIS WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER AND NONE OF OUR CONCERN.

5. AS A MATTER OF POLICY, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONSIDER NOW TAKING MEASURES TO DISTANCE OURSELVES FROM THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES WHO APPEAR TO BE GETTING READY TO CRACK DOWN ON THEIR OWN PEOPLE. ALL SIGNS INDICATE THIS IS A POPULAR UPRISING SUPPORTING BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY. THE MOVEMENT HAS BEEN NON-VIOLENT, BUT PASSIONATE. WE HAVE WAN LI COMING TO THE USA ON MAY 22 AM AND THREE U.S NAVAL SHIPS NOW IN SHANGHAI. THE SHIPS WILL QUIETLY LEAVE, WE HOPE, IN THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 22. WAN LI IS SCHEDULED TO BE IN THE USA FOR TEN DAYS. [

IF THE PRC CANCELLED WAN LI'S

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TRIP THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE THE BEST OUTCOME. IF THE TROOPS HIT CENTER BEIJING IN FIVE HOURS, I SUGGEST WE LET THE PRC EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON KNOW THAT WE BELIEVE THE TRIP SHOULD BE CANCELLED. ALSO, WE SHOULD TAKE A HARD LOOK AT GENERAL VUONO'S TRIP HERE IN TWO WEEKS. FINALLY, I SUGGEST AN IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT REITERATING OUR STRONG CONVICTION THAT VIOLENCE SHOULD NOT BE USED TO DEAL WITH THIS CURRENT SITUATION.

6. THIS CURRENT PRC GOVERNMENT IS NOT A STRONG ONE; IT MAY NOT LAST LONG; DESPITE ITS ABILITY TO SUPPRESS AN UPRISING. WHAT IS HAPPENING HERE IN OPPOSITION TO THE AUTHORITIES HAS A PERMANENCE ABOUT IT. IT IS NOT GOING TO GO AWAY --

B1

7. THESE ARE PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS IN THE HEAT OF A CRISIS. WE MAY POSSIBLY SEE A THREATENING SITUATION DISSIPATE WITH COMPROMISE AND SOME CONCILIATION. I HOPE THIS HAPPENS. THE SIGNS ARE NOT FAVORABLE. THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES SEEM TO BELIEVE IT CAN HAPPEN TONIGHT AND THE STUDENTS ARE PREPARED FOR ANYTHING.

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END OF MESSAGE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Wan Li, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and Member of the Politburo, People's Republic of China (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State-Designate
Douglas Paal, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC staff and Notetaker
Vivian Chang, Interpreter

Wan Li, Chairman of the Standing Committee of National People's Congress (NPC) and member of Politburo
Cao Zhi, Deputy to the National People's Congress, Deputy Secretary-General of the Standing Committee of the NPC
Zhu Qizhen, Vice Foreign Minister
Gu Ming, Member of the Standing Committee of the NPC, Vice Chairman of the Law Committee of the NPC
Han Xu, PRC Ambassador to the United States
Shi Guobao, Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Standing Committee of the NPC
Zhang Yijin, Director of the Department of American and Oceanic Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Yang Jiechi, Counselor of the Translation and Interpretation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter

DATE, TIME

May 23, 1989, 2:30 p.m. - 3:45 p.m.

AND PLACE:

Oval Office, Cabinet Room, and Residence

The President greeted Wan Li in the Oval Office at 2:30 - 2:40 p.m. and they then went into the Cabinet Room for the plenary session for about 30 minutes and then the President invited Wan Li and Vice Foreign Minister Zhu to the Residence for tea with Mrs. Bush. They remained there for about 30 minutes. (U)

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United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: MILLER, ROBERT
Date: 09/22/95
Case ID: 92041992

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After an exchange of pleasantries during a photo opportunity in the Oval Office, the President invited Chairman Wan to join him for a short meeting in the Cabinet Room and then to proceed to the Residence. (U)

Chairman Wan agreed to the President's proposal and said that he wanted to finish all the topics that they have to cover during those discussions. He said he would also very much like to meet with Mrs. Bush. (U)

Upon arrival in the Cabinet Room, the President extended an official welcome to Chairman Wan. He said he was delighted that the Chairman could be in Washington. He referred to the Chairman as an old personal friend. The President said he considered the visit to be very constructive -- and friendly -- for the bilateral relationship between the United States and the PRC, one that is so very important. He then offered to turn the agenda over to Chairman Wan. (U)

Chairman Wan said that it is a great pleasure and a heartwarming occasion to meet his old friend the President in Washington. He extended greetings from the Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, and Li Xiannian. He said they all extended cordial and friendly greetings from the party and government leaders. He then handed a letter to President Bush sent by President Yang Shangkun. He noted that this letter had been written before the President's letter recently sent to Chairman Deng Xiaoping. Chairman Wan explained that he had been traveling in the time since the letter had been written. (U)

Chairman Wan said that the United States President's visit to China was a complete success. Although it was brief, it played an important role in enhancing Sino-U.S. friendship. China always attached importance to Sino-U.S. relations. It viewed the relations from the long term perspective, in light of the global situation. Under the present international situation, these relations are of vital importance whether in terms of the two countries or in terms of promotion of a relaxation of international tension. Deng Xiaoping said China-U.S. relations should progress in a new pattern. The two countries should trust each other and work to minimize their troubles. (U)

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The President said that he had seen that story. (U)

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
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
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The President and Chairman Wan, together with General Scowcroft and Vice Foreign Minister Zhu, then walked to the Residence. At the Residence, the President asked how the Chairman sees the present situation playing itself out. (U)



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The President asked if this was just a handful of all those demonstrators. (U)



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EXCISE

SECRETARY'S MORNING SUMMARY FOR JUNE 2, 1983

1. CHINA: STALEMATE CONTINUES

TWO WEEKS AFTER DECLARING MARTIAL LAW IN BEIJING, HARD-LINERS REMAIN UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE LEADERSHIP CRISIS OR TO REMOVE STUDENTS FROM TIANANMEN SQUARE. IN ADDITION TO THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS OF IMPOSING ORDER AND CLARIFYING THE LINES OF AUTHORITY, LEADERS ALSO FACE THE QUESTION OF A SUCCESSOR TO DENG XIAOPING.

THE PARTY REPORTEDLY WILL HOLD A CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM ON JUNE 5. RUMORS OF A PLENUM HAVE CIRCULATED SINCE MID-MAY, BUT SO FAR THE LEADERSHIP HAS ONLY HELD "ENLARGED" MEETINGS OF THE POLITBURO, AN EXTRA-LEGAL FORUM DENG AND OTHER ELDERS CAN PACK WITH THEIR SUPPORTERS.

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19/FPC/CDR MDZ Date: 8/30/83

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OFFICIALS HAVE ORDERED WORKERS AND FARMERS TO PARTICIPATE IN RALLIES IN THE BEIJING SUBURBS TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR PREMIER LI PENG AND THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW. THE BEIJING CITY GOVERNMENT YESTERDAY EXPANDED PRESS RESTRICTIONS, PROHIBITING COVERAGE OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS AND REQUIRING THAT ALL OTHER REPORTING RECEIVE PRIOR APPROVAL. STUDENTS ATTEMPTED TO STAGE A COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION AT ONE PRO-REGIME RALLY YESTERDAY, CLASHING WITH ORGANIZERS. STUDENTS HAVE ALSO SAID THEY EXPECTED THE "GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY" STATUE IN TIANANMEN

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SQUARE TO ANGER TOP LEADERS AND PROMPT A RESPONSE. THE STUDENTS MAY HOPE AN OVERREACTION BY AUTHORITIES WILL BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO THEIR FLAGGING MOVEMENT.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

2. CHINA/ISRAEL:

CHINA AND ISRAEL ARE GRADUALLY EXPANDING THEIR PUBLIC RELATIONSHIP. TEL AVIV LOOKS FORWARD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; BEIJING, ATTUNED TO ARAB SENSITIVITIES, WILL MODULATE THE PACE OF IMPROVING RELATIONS TO PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS.

FOLLOWING THE ARAB, SOVIET LEAD CHINA CONTINUES TO LIMIT ITS POLITICAL TIES TO ISRAEL TO CONFORM WITH ARAB INTERESTS AND ITS PERCEPTIONS OF MOSCOW'S INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS UNLIKELY CHINA WILL MOVE ANY FASTER THAN THE MODERATE ARAB STATES TO GRANT ISRAEL FULL DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION. BUT CHINA HAS IN RECENT MONTHS EXPANDED PRIVATE AND CULTURAL TIES TO ISRAEL AND UPGRADED DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS.

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AS IF TO UNDERSCORE THAT POINT, CHINESE JOURNALISTS VISITED ISRAEL FOR THE FIRST TIME ON MAY 12--INTERVIEWING PERES AND FOREIGN MINISTER ARENS--EVEN AS THE FIRST ISRAELI JOURNALIST WAS GIVEN OFFICIAL CREDENTIALS TO OPERATE OUT OF BEIJING.

AN AGREEMENT IN MARCH ESTABLISHED A CHINESE TOURISM OFFICE IN TEL AVIV AND AN ISRAELI SCIENCE OFFICE IN BEIJING. IN APRIL KNESSET MEMBER YAIR TZABAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED WORKERS PARTY [MAPAM], MADE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO CHINA, THE SECOND TRIP EVER TO THE PRC BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF A ZIONIST PARTY.

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NEW PHASE IN SINO-ISRAELI RELATIONS

POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
CHINA SEEM INCREASINGLY LIKELY

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BUT SENSITIVITY TO ARAB

INTERESTS WILL ASSURE THAT BEIJING CAREFULLY MODULATES
ITS PUBLIC RELATIONSHIP WITH TEL AVIV. PROGRESS ON A
MIDDLE EASTERN SETTLEMENT WILL DETERMINE WHEN THE CHINESE
WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE THE STEP OF NORMALIZING
RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. [SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT]

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EXCISE

SECRETARY'S MORNING SUMMARY FOR JUNE 3, 1989

1. CHINA: POLICE USE TEAR GAS ON CROWDS

POLICE TODAY FIRED TEAR GAS ON CROWDS GATHERED AT THE WALLED COMPOUND OF ZHONGNANHAI, NEAR TIANANMEN SQUARE, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. THE CROWDS RETALIATED BY STONING THE POLICE, WHO WERE FORCED TO SEEK REFUGE INSIDE THE COMPOUND. SCUFFLES HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITHIN THE SQUARE AND IN OTHER PARTS OF BEIJING.

EARLIER TODAY, APPROXIMATELY 5,000 UNARMED TROOPS--THE LARGEST CONTINGENT WAS APPARENTLY FROM THE 27TH ARMY--WERE TURNED BACK BY STUDENTS AND CITIZENS AS THEY ATTEMPTED TO ADVANCE ON FOOT TO TIANANMEN SQUARE, ACCORDING TO EMBASSY AND PRESS REPORTS.

BEFORE THE ABORTIVE

TROOP MANEUVER, UNIFORMED SOLDIERS HAD TAKEN UP POSTS AT SEVERAL KEY INSTALLATIONS IN BEIJING, INCLUDING THE POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BUILDING AND THE RAILROAD STATION; OTHERS, OUT OF UNIFORM, REPORTEDLY ARE BILLETED IN MAJOR MEDIA FACILITIES.

COMMENT: PRESS REPORTS INDICATING THAT POLICE, NOT REGULAR ARMY TROOPS, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRING THE TEAR GAS SUGGEST THE INCIDENT OUTSIDE ZHONGNANHAI WAS

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ACCIDENTAL RATHER THAN A PREMEDITATED EFFORT TO ESCALATE THE LEVEL OF FORCE BEYOND THAT USED UNSUCCESSFULLY EARLIER IN THE DAY.

THE TROOPS' LACK OF WEAPONS IN THEIR EARLIER ASSAULT INDICATES THAT ORDERS NOT TO USE FORCE HAD STILL BEEN IN EFFECT. THE DISORDERLY NATURE OF THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND THE OBVIOUS CONFUSION OF MANY OF THE SOLDIERS SUGGESTS THEY WERE UNPREPARED FOR THE OUTPOURING OF OPPOSITION THEIR MOVEMENTS TRIGGERED.

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[SECRET/NOFORN]

2. CHINA: DENG'S DAMAGE LIMITATION AND THE SUCCESSION

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NEW LEASE ON LIFE

VARIOUS ACCOUNTS OF LEADERSHIP INFIGHTING SINCE AT LEAST MAY 8 HIGHLIGHT THE CENTRAL ROLE OF SEVERAL OCTOGENARIANS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT YANG SHANGKUN AND VICE PRESIDENT WANG ZHEN, AND NOMINALLY RETIRED PARTY ELDERS CHEN YUN, PENG ZHEN, AND LI XIANNIAN. HAVING APPEALED TO THEM, DENG MUST NOW GIVE THEM A VOICE IN CHOOSING A NEW LEADERSHIP TEAM AND, PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, A SAY IN FUTURE POLICY DIRECTION.

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THE PLAYERS AND THE SCORECARD

PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY KEY PARTY ELDERS SUGGEST THAT NOT ALL

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STRONGLY BACK PREMIER LI PENG. PENG ZHEN, FOR EXAMPLE,
APPARENTLY FAILED TO MENTION LI BY NAME DURING A TALK
WITH LEGISLATORS IN WHICH HE ENDORSED MARTIAL LAW AND
IMPLICITLY CRITICIZED THE IRREGULAR WAY DECISIONS HAD BEEN
MADE.

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ACT IMMEDIATE FOR CHINA WATCH ONLY

FOR DOUG PAAL
CINCPAC FOR FPA

9. 12356: DECL: OADR
NS: PGOV, PKUM, SOCI, CH
JECT: SITREP NO. 27: MARTIAL LAW WITH CHINESE
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C - ENTIRE TEXT.

THE PEOPLE OF BEIJING AWOKE ON SATURDAY, JUNE 3,
WITNESS AN EXTRAORDINARY SIGHT: THOUSANDS OF YOUNG
DIERS, BEDRAGGLED, BEFUDDLED AND SOME EVEN WEEPING,
DERING THROUGH THE CITY IN GROUPS RANGING FROM A
DFUL TO HUNDREDS, IN AN UNORGANIZED RETREAT OUT OF
CITY CENTER. FROM ABOUT 0530 TO 0800 WE WITNESSED

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FOLLOWING STRANGE EVENTS:

A BUS FULL OF ABOUT FORTY SOLDIERS SURROUNDED BY A CROWD OF SEVERAL THOUSAND ANGRY CITIZENS AT THE CORNER CHANGAN (THE CITY'S MAIN EAST-WEST ROAD) AND XIDAN. TOP OF THE BUS, STUDENTS AND OTHER YOUNG PEOPLE TOOK PICTURES POSING FOR PHOTOS HOLDING A RIFLE TAKEN FROM ONE OF THE SOLDIERS AND WEARING A HELMET AND OTHER "CAPTURED" PARAPHERNALIA.

ANOTHER BUS WITH A SIMILAR NUMBER OF SOLDIERS ABOUT TWO BLOCKS AWAY, IMMOBILIZED BY A LARGE CROWD AND BUSES PARKED ACROSS THE ROAD. SEVERAL PEOPLE IN THE CROWD SAID THAT SOLDIERS WERE ARMED WITH RIFLES AND KNIVES.

IN FRONT OF THE MAIN GATE OF THE ZHONGNANHAI LEADERSHIP COMPOUND, A STUDENT WAS DISPLAYING TO A CROWD OF SEVERAL HUNDRED A FLEXIBLE METAL ROD WHICH A SPEAKER SAID WAS CARRIED BY ALL THE SOLDIERS. THE SPEAKER SAID THE ROD COULD BE USED FOR BEATING OR KILLING PEOPLE. THIS SAME SCENE WAS REPEATED IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS AROUND THE CITY. (NOTE: THE RODS IN FACT ARE FLEXIBLE LOOPS USED TO HOLD THE SOLDIERS' WEAPONS.)

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WEARING HATS IN SHAPES. LIKE A BELT BUCKLE, THE RODS COULD BE USED TO INFLICT INJURY. END NOTE.)

NEAR THE OLD OBSERVATORY ABOUT 300 SOLDIERS MARCHING ON THE GROUND WERE SURROUNDED BY SEVERAL TIMES BY MANY CITIZENS WHO STERNLY LECTURED THE SOLDIERS ON THEIR ERRORS OF THEIR WAYS. ELDERLY WOMEN COULD BE SEEN KICKING 17-YEAR-OLD SOLDIERS WHO LOOKED SHAME-FACED TO THE GROUND.

NEAR THE RAILWAY STATION, GROUPS OF 5-10 SOLDIERS WERE SEEN WANDERING AIMLESSLY, GAFING AT THE BIG CITY CROWDS PROCEEDING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION FROM THEIR HEADQUARTERS ON THE PARALLEL MAIN ROAD.

MOST OF THE SOLDIERS WHO WERE NOT IN SOME WAY MOBILIZED BY CROWDS PROCEEDED OUT OF THE CITY CENTER, GOING BACK TO THE EASTERN SUBURBS OF TONGXIAN, FROM WHICH THEY HAD DEPARTED EARLIER IN THE EVENING. WE SAW GROUPS OF SEVERAL HUNDRED EACH, HOWEVER, WHICH REMAINED CLOSE TO THE CITY CENTER. IT WAS NOT KNOWN HOW LONG THEY WOULD STAY AT THOSE LOCATIONS.

COMMENT: OUR DATA HAS DESCRIBED THE ONGOING EVENTS "A CHINESE VERSION OF NAPOLEON'S RETREAT FROM RUSSIA." AT LEAST NAPOLEON'S TROOPS DID NOT HAVE THE

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ILIATION OF BEING LECTURED IN THEIR OWN LANGUAGE
GRANDMOTHERLY WOMEN CALLING THEM "BAD BOYS" OR
DISGRACE TO THE PLA." AS DATT HAS REPORTED, ONE
SSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE "PLAN" FOR LAST NIGHT WAS
AT THE TROOPS WHO ENTERED BY FOOT WERE TO CORDON
TIANANMEN SQUARE WHILE THE PAP AND OTHER TROOPS
CAME IN BY BUS WOULD USE CLUBS AND POSSIBLY OTHER
APONS TO IN SOME WAY FORCE THE STUDENTS OUT OF THE

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AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE

DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL CHENGDU (POUCH)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIJING 15388

NIACT IMMEDIATE FOR CHINA WATCH ONLY

NSC FOR DOUG PAAL

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, CH

SUBJECT: SITREP NO. 27: MARTIAL LAW WITH CHINESE

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SQUARE. WHATEVER THE PLAN WAS, THE RESULT WAS A COMPLETE
DISASTER. A CITY WHICH -- WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF
THE CENTRAL SQUARE -- HAD BEGUN TO RETURN TO NORMAL
IS NOW GALVANIZED AGAIN TO CONFRONT THE AUTHORITIES.
BARRICADES HAVE BEEN RESTORED AT MANY APPROACHES TO THE
SQUARE AND THE CENTER OF THE CITY SEEMS TO BE ONCE
AGAIN IN THE CONTROL OF DEMONSTRATORS. CITIZENS ARE
ANGERED BY THE EVIDENCE THAT SOME SOLDIERS WERE
CARRYING FIREARMS AND THAT A LARGER NUMBER POSSESSED

PAGE NO. 4

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THE FLEXIBLE METAL RODS, WHICH MOST PEOPLE SEEM CONVINCED WERE TO BE USED FOR PULLING PEOPLE BY THE NECK. MANY PEOPLE WHO APPROACHED US ON THE STREET SEEMED TO PROFFER A GENUINE DISILLUSIONMENT THAT THE SOLDIERS HAD AFTER ALL COME PREPARED TO USE VIOLENCE. WITH THE UNSSEENLY RETREAT, THE CITIZENS' ANGER TOWARDS THE MILITARY (AND THE AUTHORITIES BEHIND THEM) NOW IS MIXED WITH RIDICULE AND CONTEMPT. ONE MAN COMMENTED TO US ON THE STREET AT 0700 THAT ONE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED AT THE NIGHT'S EVENTS SINCE THROUGHOUT CHINESE HISTORY, WHENEVER RULERS HAVE NO SOLUTION FOR PROBLEMS WHICH THEY THEMSELVES HAVE CREATED, "THEY DO VERY FOOLISH THINGS." OF COURSE THERE ARE OTHER EXPLANATIONS WHICH WE CAN NEITHER PROVE NOR DISCARD AT THIS POINT: THAT IT WAS A PLAN WHICH THE EXECUTORS KNEW WOULD FAIL, BUT INTENDED EITHER TO PROVE THAT MUCH STRONGER FORCE WILL BE NECESSARY TO REGAIN CONTROL OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ANY MILITARY SOLUTION WILL BE COUNTERED BY THE POPULACE. END COMMENT.

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INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE
AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL SHENYANG IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHENGDU POUCH

CONFIDENTIAL BEIJING 15390

NIACI IMMEDIATE FOR CHINA WATCH

MSG FOR DOUG PAAL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, CH
SUBJECT: SITREP NO. 28: TEN TO FIFTEEN THOUSAND
ARMED TROOPS STOPPED AT CITY PERIMETER BY HUMAN AND
BUS BARRICADES

REF: BEIJING 15383

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. TEN TO FIFTEEN THOUSAND HELMETED, ARMED TROOPS
MOVED TOWARD BEIJING DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON/EARLY
EVENING HOURS OF JUNE 3. AS OF 1930, LARGE CONVOYS
HAVE BEEN STOPPED AS BEFORE BY BUS AND HUMAN
BARRICADES. THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF TROOP
TRUCKS IS ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE CITY IN FRONT
OF THE NEW WORLD TRADE CENTER, ABOUT 3-6 KILOMETERS
FROM TIANANMEN SQUARE. EYEWITNESSES SAW AT LEAST TWENTY
TRUCKS THERE, BUT MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED HAD BEEN
SEEN HEADING TOWARD THE CITY ON THAT ROUTE, SO WE
ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE ONE HUNDRED PLUS TROOP
TRUCKS AT THAT LOCATION. THE TROOPS ARE HELMETED
AND ARE CARRYING AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. MOST OF THEM
SEEM TO BE STAYING IN THEIR TRUCKS FOR THE TIME
BEING. MORE THAN 35 TRUCKS FILLED WITH HELMETED,
ARMED TROOPS ARE STOPPED AT THE SECOND RING ROAD
OVERPASS, DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE JIANGUOMENWAI
DIPLOMATIC HOUSING COMPOUND. THERE ARE REPORTEDLY
82 TRUCKS BLOCKED BY FOUR LARGE DUMP TRUCKS ALONG
THE ROAD TO CAPITAL AIRPORT. WE ALSO HAVE REPORTS
OF TWENTY SIX TRUCKS STOPPED AND SURROUNDED BY CITY
RESIDENTS BETWEEN THE LIDO HOTEL AND THE GREAT WALL
HOTEL IN THE NORTHEASTERN SUBURBS. THERE ARE ABOUT
TWO THOUSAND TROOPS JUST WEST OF THE GREAT WALL OF

PAGE 01 BEIJING 15390 031142Z 1176 SS09954

THE PEOPLE IN A STANDOFF WITH CITY RESIDENTS WHICH
HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE EARLY AFTERNOON. THE
POPULATION APPEARS HOSTILE TO PLA MOVEMENTS INTO THE
CITY.

3. ELITE AIRBORNE TROOPS ARE MOVING FROM THE SOUTH
AND TANK UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED TO MOVE. DAO
OFFICERS ARE OUT CHECKING THE WESTERN SUBURBS. DAO
IS REPORTING FURTHER DETAILS TO WASHINGTON. ALL
EMBASSY INFORMATION SO FAR SUGGESTS THAT THE UNITS
OTHER THAN THE AIRBORNE TROOPS ARE FROM THE 39TH
ARMY.

4. THE TROOPS HAVE OBVIOUSLY NOT YET BEEN GIVEN
ORDERS PERMITTING THEM TO USE FORCE. THEIR LARGE
NUMBERS, THE FACT THAT THEY ARE HELMETED, AND THE
AUTOMATIC WEAPONS THEY ARE CARRYING SUGGEST THAT THE
FORCE OPTION IS REAL. LILLEY

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5039
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7925

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PIMS, PREL, CASC, CH
SUBJECT: TFCOL: SITREP 1, 1700 EDT, 6/3/89

1. PLA MOVES ON TIANANMEN, CASUALTIES HIGH.
EMBASSY BEIJING REPORTS THAT TROOPS USING AUTOMATIC
WEAPONS ADVANCED IN TANKS, APC'S, AND TRUCKS FROM
SEVERAL DIRECTIONS ON TIANANMEN SQUARE JUNE 3. THERE
WAS CONSIDERABLE RESISTANCE BY DEMONSTRATORS, AND THE
NUMBER OF CASUALTIES APPEARS HIGH. THE EMBASSY
ESTIMATES THAT THE 50-70 REPORTED DEAD IN FOREIGN MEDIA
IS PROBABLY MUCH TOO LOW. HOSPITALS ARE SAID TO BE
OVERFLOWING WITH CASUALTIES. TIANANMEN SQUARE HAS BEEN
SURROUNDED BY TROOPS, AND SOME 3000 PROTESTERS REMAIN
WITHIN. THE EMBASSY SAYS BEIJING RESIDENTS ARE STUNNED
AND ANGERED BY THE LEVEL OF FORCE USED. (TASK

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FORCE/EMBASSY BEIJING TELCON)

2. AMERICAN REPORTERS BEATEN; NO REPORTED AMERICAN
DEATHS. THE CBS BUREAU CHIEF IN BEIJING INFORMED US
THAT AMERICAN CITIZENS RICHARD ROTH, ROBERT LUM, AND
DEXTER LEONG, AND A NEW ZEALAND CITIZEN. ALL EMPLOYED BY
CBS, WERE SEVERELY BEATEN BY CHINESE TROOPS ON TIANANMEN
SQUARE. THEIR CAMERAS WERE SMASHED AND THEY WERE

PAGE NO. 1

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DRAFTED INTO THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE. OUR EMBASSY IS FOLLOWING UP ON THEIR SITUATION. (TASK FORCE/EMBASSY BEIJING TELCON)

3. U/S KIMMITT CALLS IN CHINESE AMBASSADOR. U/S KIMMITT MET HAN XU ON JUNE 3 ABOUT 1600. KIMMITT EXPRESSED OUR DEEP REGRET AT THE USE OF FORCE, WHICH APPARENTLY RESULTED IN DEATHS AND CASUALTIES. HE URGED A RETURN TO A POLICY OF RESTRAINT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF US CITIZENS. HE STRESSED THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO BOTH COUNTRIES OF US-CHINA RELATIONS. IN RESPONSE, HAN CITED THE NEED TO RESTORE ORDER, AND HOPED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE SAID THAT AMERICAN CITIZENS WOULD BE SAFE. BAKER

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
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S E C R E T BEIJING 18706

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TEXT

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CH, US

SUBJECT: CHINA AND THE U.S. - A PROTRACTED ENGAGEMENT

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

INTRODUCTION

2. ON 19 MAY THIS YEAR THREE AMERICAN NAVAL SHIPS SAILED INTO SHANGHAI -- THIS WAS TO BE FOR US A MASTERPIECE OF TIMING -- ONE DAY AFTER GORBACHEV'S TRIP TO SHANGHAI. THE CHINESE IN AN EXQUISITE BALANCING ACT WERE WORKING WITH US TO GIVE A CLEAR SIGNAL TO ALL INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF CHINA THAT THE US-CHINA MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WAS VITAL AND REAL. THE SHIP VISIT DID NO SUCH THING -- WHAT QUEERED THE GORBACHEV VISIT WERE MASSES OF DEMONSTRATORS IN TIANANMEN SQUARE NOT OUR SHIPS. THE CHINESE DECLARED MARTIAL LAW AGAINST THEIR OWN PEOPLE IN BEIJING THE DAY WE WERE COZYING UP TO THEIR MILITARY IN SHANGHAI. WE HAD MISCALCULATED ON THE TIMING AND ON THE SYMBOLISM OF THE VISIT -- OUR ATTITUDE WAS A THROWBACK TO THE EARLY DAYS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WHEN COMMON SOVIET BASHING WAS IN VOGUE. WE WERE NOT COPING WITH OR ANTICIPATING CURRENT REALITIES.

3. WHEN WE DID DEAL WITH INTERNAL DISSENT IN CHINA, IT WAS, FOR INSTANCE, TO RENDER A SOCIAL/POLITICAL INVITATION TO CHINA'S LEADING DISSIDENT TO COME TO A DINNER PARTY WHICH THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES ANGRILY BLOCKED. NOW THAT DISSIDENT IS THE "MAN WHO CAME TO DINNER." HE IS WITH US AS A CONSTANT REMINDER OF OUR CONNECTION TO "BOURGEOIS LIBERALISM" AND PUTS US AT ODDS WITH THE REGIME HERE. HE IS A LIVING SYMBOL OF OUR CONFLICT WITH CHINA OVER HUMAN RIGHTS.

4. TODAY THE CHINESE ARE ENGAGED IN A MASSIVE CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT U.S. INFLUENCE TO THE CHINESE PEOPLE. AT THE SAME TIME CHINA WANTS OUR TRADE, OUR TECHNOLOGY AND ENOUGH OF A SECURITY CONNECTION SO THAT IT DOES NOT END UP FACING THE SOVIET UNION ALONE. CHINA NOW CONFRONTS A SEVERE EROSION OF POPULAR TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE LEADERSHIP, THE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC STAGFLATION AND POSSIBLY RECESSION, AND A SHATTERED IMAGE TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD. THE OVERALL PROSPECTS ARE GRIM AND THE TECHNIQUES CHINA USES TO DEAL WITH ITS CRISIS ARE BACKWARD AND CONSERVATIVE BUT STILL, OCCASIONALLY CUNNING. HARDLINERS DOMINATE TEMPORARILY,

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BUT THERE ARE CONSTANT SIGNS OF A LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE BETWEEN FORCES REPRESENTING AN OUTWARD ORIENTATION AND THOSE THAT PREFER TO TURN INWARD.

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5. THIS TELEGRAM TRIES TO DESCRIBE WHAT CHINA HAS DONE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP TO ALTER ITS NATURE, WHY IT HAS DONE THESE THINGS, AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT THEM.

WHAT CHINA HAS DONE

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6. THE MAIN FOCUS HAS BEEN A NUMBING PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WHICH HAS RETURNED TO SOME OF THE THEMES OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND OF THE EARLY 1970'S. IT DIRECTLY LINKS THE U.S. WITH THE HATEFUL "BOURGEOIS LIBERALIZATION." THE U.S. IS BEHIND THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES (BY COMMUNIST DEFINITION COUNTER-REVOLUTION MUST HAVE EXTERNAL INSTIGATION). THE U.S. SUPER POWER SEEKS TO INTERFERE IN CHINESE AFFAIRS AND TO PUSH CHINA AROUND. IT IS A BLATANT APPEAL TO ANTI-FOREIGNISM AND CHINESE CHAUVINISM AND AS SUCH IT HAS HAD SOME EFFECT. BUT BY DOING SO, THE REGIME PUSHES THE UNITED STATES IN THE DIRECTION OF THE MAJORITY OF CHINESE WHO DETEST THE REGIME AND WHO WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE TO HAVE A GOOD SHOT OF CONSUMERISM AND MORE FUN IN LIFE.

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7. ON THE MORE CONCRETE SIDE, CHINESE REACTIONS HAVE OFTEN BEEN PARALLEL TO OUR OWN MEASURES AND RELATIVELY MODEST. WE SUDDENLY AND WITHOUT WARNING PUBLICLY CUT ARMS SALES AND MILITARY AND HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS. THE CHINESE ANGRILY DISCONTINUED EXCHANGE TRIPS IN MOTION, GENERALS VUONO AND GRAY, AND CUT CONTACTS WITH OUR DAO OFFICERS, STEPS WHICH TOOK THEM THREE WEEKS AFTER THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED AMERICAN FIRST STEPS TO DECIDE UPON AND TO
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 BEIJING 18706

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CH, US

SUBJECT: CHINA AND THE U.S. - A PROTRACTED ENGAGEMENT

COMMUNICATE TO US. THE ABRUPT MILITARY CUTOFF WAS PARTICULARLY GALLING TO THE CHINESE AFTER ALL THE HYPE WHICH WENT INTO GLORIFYING THE RELATIONSHIP. EACH HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY VISIT WAS A GLOWING MONUMENT TO OUR FRIENDLY COOPERATION. THERE WERE SOME NASTY BLIPS -- SUCH AS SILKWORM AND CONSTANT CHINESE COMPLAINTS ABOUT OUR EXPORT CONTROLS. BUT WE HAD NOT FACTORED INTO THE RELATIONSHIP THE
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[7 WE HAVE NEVERTHELESS THE
BASIS FOR A MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN PLACE. NEXT
TIME WE SHOULD DO BETTER.

/ 8. THE CHINESE HAVE USED THEIR PRESS TO UNDERSCORE
THE CLIMATE OF TENSION THEY HAVE CREATED AND WHICH
IS PURPOSELY CALCULATED TO INTIMIDATE. THIS HAS
GIVEN THE SIGNAL TO LOWER LEVEL SECURITY MINIONS
TO ACT, WITH THE CONSEQUENCE THAT AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN
IN SHANGHAI AND GUANGZHOU HAVE BEEN HARASSED WITH
ACCUSATIONS OF CORRUPTION.

9. A GROSS FORM OF THIS TENSION AND INTIMIDATION
IS THE POSTING OF GUARDS WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS
AROUND THE EMBASSY'S BUILDINGS AND ARMED SENTRIES
NEAR THE MAIN GATE OF THE JIANGUOMENWAI COMPOUND
(WHICH ALSO HAS ONE OF ITS THREE EXITS BLOCKED).
THE JUNE 7 FIRING ON THE JIANGUOMENWAI RESIDENTIAL
COMPOUND INCLUDING MANY OF OUR APARTMENTS ALSO
FALLS IN THE AREA OF INTIMIDATING FOREIGNERS IN
GENERAL TO KEEP A LOWER PROFILE.

/ 10. IN LINE WITH THEIR PORTRAYAL OF THE U.S. AS
CORRUPTING, WE HAVE SEEN A RELUCTANCE -- WHETHER IT
IS INDIVIDUAL CAUTION OR STRUCTURAL ISNTCILEAR --
ON THE PART OF THE LAST OF THIS YEAR'S INTERNATIONAL
VISITOR GRANTEES TO ACCEPT OUR INVITATIONS.

11. THE PEACE CORPS PROGRAM FOR SICHUAN HAS BEEN
POSTPONED. CHINESE OPPOSITION TO THIS PROGRAM --
ALWAYS STRONG -- ROSE UP AND STRUCK DOWN THE
MODERATES WHO WERE PUSHING IT. 7
OUR FRIENDS REALLY DID NOT HAVE A CHANCE ONCE THE
MOOD AT THE TOP SWUNG AGAINST US. B1

12. THE CHINESE HAVE EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM OF
INTIMIDATING THE FOREIGN MEDIA, ESPECIALLY THE
AMERICAN MEDIA AND VOA. THE POINT IS TO CLOSE-TEHE
DOOR TO BEAT THE DOG. THEY REALISTICALLY UNDERSTAND
THAT CONTINUING PUBLIC VIOLENCE AGAINST THEIR OWN
PEOPLE RISKS FOREIGN SUPPORT. THIS WAS THE LESSON
FOR THEM OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF TIANANMEN.

/ 13. THE CHINESE HAVE SINGLED US OUT FROM THE EC
AND JAPAN FOR MORE OF THEIR VITRIOL ALTHOUGH THE
EC, AND ESPECIALLY FRANCE, HAVE BEEN AT LEAST AS
AGGRESSIVE IN THEIR REACTIONS TO CHINESE SUPPRESSION
AS WE HAVE. THE CHINESE NEED A SINGLE BOGEYMAN. WE
WERE IN FACT THE MAIN FOREIGN INFLUENCE NOT ONLY
AT TIANANMEN BUT THROUGHOUT CHINA. THEY ALSO WANT TO
DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US AND OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

[FOR
INSTANCE HAVE WORKED OVER THE LATIN AMERICANS HERE
WITH HARSH CRITICISM OF THE U.S. AS IMPERIALISTIC
AND PREDATORY, THEMES WHICH PROBABLY GET SOME B1

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RESONANCE IN THESE CIRCLES.

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14. THE CHINESE HAVE ALSO TURNED ON THE HIGH-LEVEL CHARM FOR VISITING AMERICAN BUSINESS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS. AT&T GOT ACCESS TO DING GUANGEN AND UTC TO LI RUIHUAN, DANIEL WONG TO LI PENG. THE CHINESE THEME TO THESE PEOPLE IS LET US COOPERATE AND MOVE FORWARD -/ THE ONLY OBSTACLE IS THE USG. WHAT HAS FRUSTRATED THE CHINESE IN ALL OF THIS IS THEIR MOVES TO OUTFLANK US SO FAR HAVE NOT WORKED WELL. MOST AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN WILL NOT ACCEPT THE CHINESE BIG LIE AND WILL NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO PROPAGANDA MANIPULATION. THE USUAL APOLOGISTS FOR CHINA WHO HAVE TRADITIONALLY END RUN THE USG HAVE NOT BEEN VOCAL IN RESPONSE TO CHINESE BLANDISHMENTS. THUS THE CHINESE ARE ON THE DEFENSIVE AND HAVE TURNED THEIR EFFORTS INWARD, TRYING TO PERSUADE THEIR OWN--
S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 BEIJING 18706

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CH, US

SUBJECT: CHINA AND THE U.S. - A PROTRACTED ENGAGEMENT

POPULATION. THEY HAVE NOT YET SUCCEEDED IN CARRYING THE PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE TO US IN OUR OWN COUNTRY.

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15. THE CHINESE HAVE WITH MCDONNELL DOUGLAS POSTPONED AN EXPANSION OF 20 AIRCRAFT FOR THEIR JOINT VENTURE BECAUSE THEY CLAIM THEY LACK FOREIGN EXCHANGE. FOR SOME TIME EVEN WELL BEFORE 3 JUNE THE CHINESE HAVE TRIED TO CUT BACK ON IMPORTS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPENDITURES AND THIS HAS HURT OUR BUSINESS HERE. THEY WERE CERTAINLY WORRIED WE WOULD HOLD UP SALE OF BOEINGS AND INERTIAL GUIDANCE SYSTEMS AND THAT WE WOULD ALTER OUR AGREEMENT ON SATELLITE LAUNCHING. RENEGING ON COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS FOR POLITICAL REASONS IS SOMETHING THE CHINESE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST WITH THE JAPANESE -- AND CERTAINLY THE RUSSIANS DID THIS TO THE CHINESE IN 1960. BUT THE CHINESE EMPLOY A DUAL STANDARD AND IT REMAINS A HIGHLY EXPLOSIVE ISSUE AS THE RUSSIANS FOUND OUT IN 1960. WE SHOULD THEREFORE HONOR THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS EVEN IF THE CHINESE OCCASIONALLY HAVE NOT. WE LIVE BY THE RULE OF LAW AND WE ARE TRYING TO GET THEM TO DO THE SAME. WE WERE RIGHT AN/ WISE IN ISSUING EXPORT LICENSES FOR BOEING AND HONEYWELL, AND WE SHOULD DELIVER ON THE SATELLITE LAUNCH. NOT ONLY DO WE HELP THE GOOD GUYS, AND THERE ARE A LOT OF THEM IN CHINA, BUT WE ALSO HELP OURSELVES FINANCIALLY. DESPITE CONGRESSIONAL FEELINGS WHICH WE REALIZE ARE

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EXDIS

STRONG AND MUST BE CONSIDERED, WE ARE NOT REWARDING THE MURDERERS OF TIANANMEN BY SELLING BOEING AIRCRAFT FOR HARD CASH. LET A THOUSAND POINTS OF BUSINESS DECISIONS WORK IN CHINA BASED ON OUR OWN BUSINESSES' REALISTIC ASSESSMENTS OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS FOR CHINA. POSTPONING THE DECISIONS ON IFI LOANS IS A SUFFICIENT GOVERNMENTAL INPUT INTO THIS PROCESS. IT IS BOTH MULTINATIONAL AND IS AIMED AT CHINA'S GOVERNMENT FOR ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FAILURES.

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16. CHINESE ATTITUDES ON CERTAIN FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES MAY HAVE SHIFTED SOMEWHAT. WE HAVE TO WATCH THEM ON CAMBODIA, WE NEED TO RESTRAIN ANY CHINESE SUPPORT FOR PROTRACTED WARFARE AND STRONGER LINKS TO THE KHMER ROUGE AND ENCOURAGE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN A QUADRIPARTITE SOLUTION AND ON PEACE KEEPING SUPERVISION. IN KOREA DESPITE CLEAR COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE, CHINESE MAY GIVE MORE VOCAL SUPPORT TO NORTH KOREA. [

] WAS LEADING THE CHARGE ON THE FAST-MOVING OPENING TO SOUTH KOREA. / WE NEED TO ENCOURAGE FAVORABLE LONG TERM TRENDS FOR IMPROVING ROK/CHINESE RELATIONS. ON AFGHANISTAN, THE CHINESE MAY BE SHIFTING TO A MORE EVEN-HANDED POSITION BETWEEN NAJIBULLAH AND THE MUHAJADEEN. WE NEED TO ENCOURAGE CONTINUED CHINESE SUPPORT TO THE RESISTANCE. AND, OF COURSE, THEY WILL FLOG A BETTER SOVIET RELATIONSHIP TO US AND TO THE WORLD HOPING IN PART THEY CAN SCARE SOME AMERICANS INTO MORE ACCOMMODATION. BUT IN EACH OF THESE CASES, CHINESE NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE NOT SERVED BY GOING TOO FAR -- SO THERE MAY BE MORE SMOKE THAN FIRE.

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WHAT ARE THE CHINESE AFTER?

17. FIRST OF ALL, THIS REGIME WANTS TO STAY IN POWER. SOME OF THE LEADERSHIP BELIEVES WE THREATEN THEIR POWER THROUGH OUR LINKS TO CHINESE WHO HAVE OPENLY DESPISED THEM AND WORKED AGAINST THEM. THEY MUST DISCREDIT THESE LINKS. SECOND, THE CHINESE MUST HAVE ECONOMIC PROSPERITY -- THE OPENING TO THE WEST, INCLUDING TO THE U.S., IS PERCEIVED AS ESSENTIAL TO THIS. THIRD, THE CHINESE PEOPLE MUST BE WHIPPED INTO LINE. PROFLIGATE TENDENCIES MUST BE CONTROLLED, DISCIPLINE REASSERTED. RECENTRALIZATION OF) AUTHORITY AND CONTROL IS CRUCIAL TO THIS. FOURTH, CHINESE NATIONALISM (OR PATRIOTISM) HAS TO BE REIGNITED. HONG KONG, SINGAPORE, TAIWAN, AND THE OVERSEAS CHINESE ARE THEIR OBJECTIVES. INTERNALLY THE CHINESE RELENTLESSLY PUSH TRUST THE PARTY, LOVE THE PLA AND RESPECT THE LEADERSHIP, DESPITE A HUGE CREDIBILITY GAP. THE CONTRADICTION IN THIS IS CLEAR -- HOW CAN CHINA ATTRACT THE OCEAN MENTALITY OF ITS OWN

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 BEIJING 18706

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CH, US

SUBJECT: CHINA AND THE U.S. - A PROTRACTED ENGAGEMENT

CHINESE OVERSEAS WHILE FOSTERING A CONTINENTAL MENTALITY IN ITS PEOPLE ON THE MAINLAND -- THIS WAS THE CENTRAL THEME OF RIVER ELEGY (HE SHANG) NOW BANNED IN CHINA.

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18. SIMILARLY, HOW CAN CHINA ATTRACT THE WEST ECONOMICALLY AND CONDEMN IT POLITICALLY. CAN CHINA HAVE IT BOTH WAYS? DENG SAYS, YES, IT CAN, AND THIS IS THE COMPROMISE HE FORGES BETWEEN THE HARDLINERS IN HIS LEADERSHIP AND THE MODERATE REFORMERS. JIANG ZEMIN, THE NEW PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL, IS THE SYMBOL OF THIS COMPROMISE. I

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WHAT DO WE THEN DO ABOUT IT?

19. HERE ARE SOME SUGGESTIONS:

-- STAY IN STEP WITH WESTERN ALLIES AND JAPAN. THIS IS WHAT MADE THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE IFI LOANS SO EFFECTIVE.

-- RECOMMEND AGAINST WASHINGTON MICRO-MANAGING THE SITUATION HERE. THERE IS TOO MUCH WORK ON POLICY AT HOME TO BE DEFLECTED THIS WAY. THE KUNMING MISSIONARY EPISODE, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS AN UNNECESSARY BURDEN. FURTHERMORE, IT WAS WRONG TO SEE THIS INCIDENT AS PART OF A HEAVY-HANDED RESPONSE TO THE CURRENT SITUATION. CHINA (AND TAIWAN) HAS A LONG ANTI-MISSIONARY HISTORY AND FAIRLY CONSISTENTLY EXPELS SUCH PROSELYTIZERS. THIS GROUP ACTUALLY GOT OFF COMPARATIVELY LIGHTLY; NO FINES, JUST EXPEDITIOUS DEPARTURE. WE DID NOT NEED ANOTHER HOT BILATERAL ISSUE ON THIS ONE.

-- CONSIDER FORMATS FOR QUIET, HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE. WE NOTE THAT FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON IS PLANNING A TRIP TO CHINA. IN THIS REGARD WE WANT TO CAREFULLY VET OUR INTERLOCUTORS SO AS NOT TO BECOME DEPENDENT ON ONE GROUP, SUCH AS OVERSEAS CHINESE.

-- WHEN REVIEWING THE TRAVEL ADVISORY AND THE RETURN OF DEPENDENTS, WE SHOULD GIVE CREDENCE TO THE DIFFERENCES IN BEIJING AND THE OTHER REGIONS

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OF CHINA. TREAT OTHER AREAS BETTER THAN BEIJING WHEN POSSIBLE.

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-- A MAJOR SPEECH FROM A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL SUMMING UP U.S. CONCERNS AND HOPES COULD BE SCHEDULED FOR LATE AUGUST AFTER CONGRESS GOES INTO RECESS.

-- WE NEED TO PUT MORE OF OUR EMPHASIS ON A COASTAL STRATEGY FOR CHINA.

WE SHOULD CONTINUE THE FULBRIGHT SCHOLAR EXCHANGES AND OTHER CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND S/T EXCHANGES. WE SHOULD RENEW THE S/T AGREEMENT AND PURSUE GETTING IPR GUARANTEES FROM THE CHINESE BECAUSE THESE ARE LONG-TERM BASIC ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HELP THE CHINESE WHO LOOK OUTWARD, NOT INWARD. THIS ALSO MEANS KEEPING OUR WORKING RELATIONS GOING BELOW THE A/S LEVEL TO INCLUDE CIVIL AIR CONSULTATIONS, NARCOTICS MATTERS, AND ACTIVE EMBASSY/DEPARTMENTAL AND EMBASSY/MFA TALKS BOTH PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL AT ALL LEVELS.

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-- WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE VARIABLE OF THE UNCONTROLLED AMERICAN REACTION TO CHINA. OUR MEDIA, OUR ACADEMICS, DISAPPOINTED BUSINESSMEN, CONGRESSMEN WILL ALL ATTACK CHINA AND WILL GO WELL BEYOND USG POLICY. SOME CHINESE WILL SEE AN ANTI-CHINESE CONSPIRACY AND THEY WILL ATTACK US IN KIND. DEMONSTRATORS IN THE U.S. WILL
S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 BEIJING 18706

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CH, US
SUBJECT: CHINA AND THE U.S. - A PROTRACTED ENGAGEMENT

MARCH ON THE CHINESE EMBASSY, AND WE WILL TAKE A HIT IN RETALIATION HERE. THIS REQUIRES US TO KEEP ARTICULATING OUR POLICIES TO INFLUENTIAL AMERICANS. A PROMISING START HAS BEEN MADE WITH THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY HERE.

-- DO NOT LET THE CHINESE ESTABLISH A DICHOTOMY BETWEEN GOOD SUBSTANTIVE HIGH-LEVEL TALKS AND BASHING US ON THE GROUND IN BEIJING. WE ARE VULNERABLE HERE, AND THIS IS WHERE WE HAVE TRADITIONALLY TAKEN THE HARASSMENT. WE DID NOT WORK OUR EIGHT DOING-BUSINESS ISSUES EFFECTIVELY INTO THE PRESIDENT'S FEBRUARY VISIT TO CHINA. WE DID NOT ADEQUATELY PROTEST IN

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WASHINGTON THE FIRING ON 7 JUNE AT OUR DIPLOMATIC RESIDENCES IN CHINA. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE TOUGH RECIPROCITY ON PROPERTY, ACCESS AND TRAVEL. WE NEED TO COORDINATE CAREFULLY WITH WASHINGTON TO DEVISE STRATEGIES THAT WORK TO CURB EFFECTIVELY CHINESE EXCESSES AND TO KEEP THE FINGER POINTED AT THE REAL PERPETRATORS.

/

91

! -- FINALLY, WE HAVE A FINE LINE TO WALK BETWEEN DOING BUSINESS WITH THE CURRENT DECLINING LEADERSHIP AND ITS ERRATIC AND SOMETIMES HOSTILE POLICIES, AND MAINTAINING SUPPORT FOR AND CONTACT WITH FUTURE FORCES IN CHINA AND OUT WHICH ARE MORE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR BELIEFS AND INTERESTS. FOR THE CHINESE OUR MESSAGE SHOULD BE IF YOU WANT AMERICAN BUSINESS, YOU ALSO GET VOA. WE CAN CALIBRATE THIS, BUT OUR BASIC PRINCIPLES WON'T CHANGE.

LILLEY

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1989 5922880

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ADVANCE COPIES TO:

OCT - 4 1989

S/S-2
S/S-1 COPYNATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
 THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
 THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
 THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward the Persian Gulf (U)

Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own. The United States also remains committed to support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense and thereby reduce the necessity for unilateral U.S. military intervention. The United States also will encourage the effective support and participation of our western allies and Japan to promote our mutual interests in the Persian Gulf region. (U)

Force Levels

I endorse the Secretary of Defense's decision to reduce the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean to the deployment of either a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) or a Battleship Battle Group (BBBG) for six months annually. Whenever the U.S. naval presence is "gapped", the Department of Defense will designate a CVBG or BBBG to respond to contingencies in the region on short notice. The Department of Defense also should attempt to schedule other military deployments or activities in the region during such

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periods. Any future major force reductions or adjustments in the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf will be undertaken only after appropriate interagency consultations. The Director of Central Intelligence should increase collection on early warning indicators in the Gulf area, particularly when there is a "gap" in the U.S. Indian Ocean presence. (S)

It is important for the United States to continue to nurture the mutually beneficial and enduring cooperative security relationships with the GCC states that grew out of the Iran/Iraq war. The Department of Defense should seek to maintain and, if possible, increase its peacetime and contingency access to friendly regional states, and to broaden the scope of security cooperation through military exercises, prepositioning arrangements and contingency planning. (S)

Arms Sales

The United States will sell U.S. military equipment to help friendly regional states meet their legitimate defense requirements, so long as such sales do not present a security threat to Israel. (C)

The Secretaries of State and Defense should develop a strategy for a long-term program of arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states that serves our national interest but does not increase Israel's security burden. This strategy should focus on those sales likely to be requested that might be controversial, such as main battle tanks and advanced fighter aircraft, and outline actions for the Administration to undertake in order to obtain congressional and domestic support for such sales. (S)

Iraq

Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq. At the same time, the Iraqi leadership must understand that any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons will lead to economic and political sanctions, for which we would seek the broadest possible support from our allies and friends. Any breach by Iraq of IAEA safeguards in its nuclear program will result in a similar response. Human rights considerations should continue to be an important element in our policy toward Iraq. In addition, Iraq should be urged to cease its meddling in external affairs, such as in Lebanon, and be encouraged to play a constructive role in negotiating a settlement with Iran and cooperating in the Middle East peace process. (S)

We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area, where they do not conflict with

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our non-proliferation and other significant objectives. Also, as a means of developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment, the United States should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, e.g., training courses and medical exchanges, on a case by case basis. (S)

Iran

The United States should continue to be prepared for a normal relationship with Iran on the basis of strict reciprocity. A process of normalization must begin with Iranian action to cease its support for international terrorism and help obtain the release of all American hostages, which will not be a matter for bargaining or blackmail. Other criteria Iran must meet before full normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations include halting its subversive activities and improving relations with its neighbors, making a good faith effort toward a peace treaty with Iraq, and improving its human rights practices. (C)

It is critical that the United States continue to speak with one voice regarding Iran. The Department of State should be the conduit for all contacts with Iran, keeping other National Security Council members informed. Except for authorized U.S. Government officials meeting with any potential source who may have information that could help obtain release of our hostages in Lebanon, our dealings should be with Iranian government officials, not with factions or intermediaries. (C)

The Soviet Union

The United States should continue to engage the Soviets in a dialogue on regional issues, doing what we can to discourage arms sales and potential meddling in Iran and elsewhere in the region. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 2, 1989

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89 OCT-04 7:30 PM

EXCISE

(R84)

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 26

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
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periods. Any future major force reductions or adjustments in the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf will be undertaken only after appropriate interagency consultations. The Director of Central Intelligence should increase collection on early warning indicators in the Gulf area, particularly when there is a "gap" in the U.S. Indian Ocean presence. (S)

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We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area, where they do not conflict with

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our non-proliferation and other significant objectives. Also, as a means of developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment, the United States should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, e.g., training courses and medical exchanges, on a case by case basis. (S)

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The Soviet Union

The United States should continue to engage the Soviets in a dialogue on regional issues, doing what we can to discourage arms sales and potential meddling in Iran and elsewhere in the region. (S)

Ag Bush

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DECEMBER 4, 1989

CABLE TO LIMA: ANDEAN SUMMIT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT GARCIA
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I AM HAPPY TO CONFIRM MY ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR INVITATION EXTENDED AT ICA TO JOIN YOU AND THE PRESIDENTS OF ~~PERU~~ ^{BOLIVIA} AND COLOMBIA TO PARTICIPATE IN A FOUR-COUNTRY ANDEAN SUMMIT TO DISCUSS OUR COMMON INTEREST IN COUNTERING NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING AND TO EXPLORE WAYS TO COORDINATE OUR COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICIES. I APPRECIATE YOUR PLEDGE, IN YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 20, TO SUPPORT OUR COMMON BATTLE AGAINST DRUG ADDICTION, PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING; AND I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH YOU, PRESIDENT PAZ ZAMORA, AND PRESIDENT BARCO IN CARTAGENA ON FEBRUARY 15.

IT IS MY HOPE THAT AT THE SUMMIT WE CAN AGREE ON A BROAD STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE CAN INTENSIFY AND COORDINATE THE ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS OF OUR GOVERNMENTS. I AM VERY MUCH AWARE, THAT FOR OUR JOINT EFFORT TO SUCCEED, WE MUST DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE COCAINE EPIDEMIC. THIS MEANS WE MUST WORK ASSIDUOUSLY TO REDUCE DEMAND IN THE CONSUMING COUNTRIES, AND I AM PAINFULLY AWARE THAT MY COUNTRY IS THE PRIME CONSUMER. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST JOINTLY ATTACK THE ENTIRE COCAINE NETWORK FROM PRODUCTION OF COCA LEAF, THROUGH PROCESSING, TO SHIPMENT TO CONSUMERS TO RID OUR COUNTRIES OF THE CANCER OF DRUG TRAFFICKING. WE MUST ALSO PROVIDE LEGITIMATE ALTERNATIVES TO THE FARMERS IN PRODUCING COUNTRIES WHO ARE CULTIVATING COCA.

THIS SUMMIT WILL GIVE US THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH EACH OTHER ON ISSUES OF VITAL INTEREST TO OUR PEOPLE. I LOOK FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU AND TO WORK TOGETHER TO FREE OUR NATIONS FROM THE TYRANNY OF DRUGS.

SINCERELY,

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE ^{W/IPS/CR/IR} ^{DC} Date SEP 26, 1996
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DECEMBER 4, 1989

CABLE TO LA PAZ: ANDEAN SUMMIT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT PAZ
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

IT IS A PLEASURE TO CONFIRM MY ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR INVITATION EXTENDED AT ICA TO JOIN YOU AND THE PRESIDENTS OF PERU AND COLOMBIA TO PARTICIPATE IN A FOUR-COUNTRY ANDEAN SUMMIT TO DISCUSS OUR COMMON INTEREST IN COUNTERING NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING AND TO EXPLORE WAYS TO COORDINATE OUR POLICIES IN THESE AREAS. I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH YOU, PRESIDENT GARCIA, AND PRESIDENT BARCO IN CARTAGENA ON FEBRUARY 15.

IT IS MY HOPE THAT AT THE SUMMIT WE CAN AGREE ON A BROAD STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE CAN INTENSIFY AND COORDINATE THE ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS OF OUR GOVERNMENTS. I AM VERY MUCH AWARE, THAT FOR OUR JOINT EFFORT TO SUCCEED, WE MUST DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE COCAINE EPIDEMIC. THIS MEANS WE MUST WORK ASSIDUOUSLY TO REDUCE DEMAND IN THE CONSUMING COUNTRIES, AND I AM PAINFULLY AWARE THAT MY COUNTRY IS THE PRIME CONSUMER. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST JOINTLY ATTACK THE ENTIRE COCAINE NETWORK FROM PRODUCTION OF COCA LEAF, THROUGH PROCESSING, TO SHIPMENT TO CONSUMERS TO RID OUR COUNTRIES OF THE CANCER OF DRUG TRAFFICKING. WE MUST ALSO PROVIDE LEGITIMATE ALTERNATIVES TO THE FARMERS IN PRODUCING COUNTRIES WHO ARE CULTIVATING COCA.

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SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE RM/IPS/CR/IR DC SEP 26 1994
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DECEMBER 4, 1989

CABLE TO BOGOTA: ANDEAN SUMMIT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT BARCO
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

IT IS A PLEASURE TO CONFIRM MY ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR INVITATION EXTENDED AT ICA TO JOIN YOU AND THE PRESIDENTS OF PERU AND BOLIVIA IN CARTAGENA ON FEBRUARY 15 TO PARTICIPATE IN A FOUR-COUNTRY ANDEAN SUMMIT ON THE PROBLEM OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. YOUR DEMONSTRATED COURAGE IN CONFRONTING THE TRAFFICKERS WILL PROVIDE INSPIRATION AND PURPOSE TO THE MEETING, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT TOGETHER WE CAN ACCOMPLISH MUCH.

IT IS MY HOPE THAT AT THE SUMMIT WE CAN AGREE ON A BROAD STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE CAN INTENSIFY AND COORDINATE THE ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS OF OUR GOVERNMENTS. I AM VERY MUCH AWARE, THAT FOR OUR JOINT EFFORT TO SUCCEED, WE MUST DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE COCAINE EPIDEMIC. THIS MEANS WE MUST WORK ASSIDUOUSLY TO REDUCE DEMAND IN THE CONSUMING COUNTRIES, AND I AM PAINFULLY AWARE THAT MY COUNTRY IS THE PRIME CONSUMER. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST JOINTLY ATTACK THE ENTIRE COCAINE NETWORK FROM PRODUCTION OF COCA LEAF, THROUGH PROCESSING, TO SHIPMENT TO CONSUMERS TO RID OUR COUNTRIES OF THE CANCER OF DRUG TRAFFICKING. WE MUST ALSO PROVIDE LEGITIMATE ALTERNATIVES TO THE FARMERS IN PRODUCING COUNTRIES WHO ARE CULTIVATING COCA.

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Case Number: S199900030

Chile Project (#S199900030)

U.S. Department of State

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PAGE 01 STATE 064112

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APPROVED BY: ARA/FO:M M SKOL

ARA/SC:K C SMITH, ARA/SC:B A OWENS, P:S G WESCHE,

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TO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

UNCLAS STATE 064112

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TAGS: OPDC, CI

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT PINOCHET'S LETTER TO
PRESIDENT BUSH

1. THE EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT PINOCHET IN
RESPONSE TO PINOCHET'S JANUARY 10, 1990 LETTER. NO RPT NO
SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 10 CONTAINING YOUR
VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILE DURING YOUR TERM AS
PRESIDENT. THE UNITED STATES IS GRATIFIED THAT CHILE HAS
RETURNED TO DEMOCRACY AND COMMENDS ITS SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS. WE JOIN THE REST
OF THE WORLD IN CELEBRATING CHILE'S RETURN TO THE FAMILY
OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONS. WE PLEDGE OUR SUPPORT TO THE
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PAGE 02 STATE 064112

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Page: 1

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Case Number: S199900030

Page: 2

CHILEAN PEOPLE IN PRESERVING THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY,
JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT
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Page: 2

Subject: DRAFT LETTER

Date: 03-01-1990

To: AREVALO, V C

From: BUSH, G

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DRAFT LETTER

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RELEASED

Dear Mr. President:

As you begin the final year of your administration, I want to express my country's support for Guatemala's democratic institutions and my concern over the rising level of violence in Guatemala and the threat it poses to a peaceful transition to a new civilian government.

I am well aware that the people of Guatemala and your government have worked hard to establish democratic rule. Twice, you have rallied to defend democracy against coup attempts.

Every day, Guatemala's democracy continues to be challenged by acts of terrorism and human rights abuses perpetrated by extremists who seek to undermine civilian government. These acts are carried out with impunity and total disregard for the rights of Guatemalan citizens.

Those who commit these acts must be apprehended and prosecuted in order to demonstrate that your government will not tolerate violations of the rule of law which threaten the liberty of all Guatemalan citizens.

His Excellency
Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo,
President of the Republic of Guatemala,
Guatemala.

United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: MOSKOWITZ, SAM
Date: 07/13/95
Case ID: 95122233

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We have worked to assist you through the professional training of the police and the judiciary. Also, we have been pleased to respond to your recent request for FBI assistance to resolve the brutal murders of Hector Oqueli and Gilda Flores. While my government continues to support these efforts, I urge your government to act to ensure that human rights abuses do not go unpunished.

1990 will be a very important year for Guatemala. As you move to consolidate the achievements of your administration, I hope that the strengthening of the rule of law will be one of your lasting legacies to the people of Guatemala.

Sincerely,

George Bush

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1990

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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority for Reporting to the Congress on the Andean Summit Pursuant to Section 2(d) of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1989

You are hereby delegated the authority for submitting to the Congress the report on the outcome of the Andean Summit required by section 2(d) of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-231).

This memorandum shall be published in the Federal Register.

Ag Bush



DEPARTMENT OF STATE *902309* IS/FPC/CDR *an* Date *8/22/96*

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**Subject: DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
PRESIDENT SALINAS**

Date: 10-15-1990

To: SALINAS

From: BUSH, GEORGE

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El Salvador: Human Rig
Special Project (1993)

State Department
Draft Letter from the President
to President Salinas, President Perez,
and Prime Minister Gonzalez

Dear:

I was very gratified to hear from you during our meeting in New York at the UNGA that you have accepted the Secretary General's request to become directly engaged in support of the U.N.'s efforts to mediate a successful political settlement to the war in El Salvador. I very much welcome your efforts, and I am confident that you can make a decisive difference in helping to bring both peace and the consolidation of democracy to El Salvador.

Since you will be playing such an important, direct, and personal role, I want to share my own assessment of the situation with you and offer my personal support for your efforts, and those of the other leaders who have enlisted in this effort with you.

You and I spoke about our joint concerns for the situation in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua. I believe that ending the war in El Salvador is crucial to realizing the long-term hopes of the leaders and peoples of Central America for democracy, demilitarization, and development.

United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: HOFFENBERG, MARV
Date: 06/03/94
Case ID: S940036D

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El Salvador: Human Rights
Special Project (1993)

- 2 -

President Cristiani, I believe, is seriously committed to finding a negotiated solution to the war that takes into account the legitimate security concerns of FMLN combatants. I am also impressed with the consensus which appears to have developed among the political parties in the Inter-Party Commission for electoral and judicial reform. We support and endorse these efforts.

Clearly, the issue of the armed forces is the most difficult and sensitive one; my information is that Cristiani has put meaningful and far-reaching offers on the table. Nevertheless, as Cristiani grows more flexible, the FMLN appears to be hardening its demands.

If the current logjam is not broken, I fear the process could collapse and be replaced with renewed violence. It is crucial that all of us set as our goal a breakthrough in the next round of negotiations leading as quickly as possible to a U.N.-supervised cease-fire.

I will do my part, both by supporting Cristiani and by pressing for flexibility and greater respect for human rights. Unfortunately, I do not believe there is much pressure for serious bargaining on either the FMLN or on Cuba, which continues to arm and train FMLN combatants. Here I hope you will use your influence. If both Cuba and the FMLN know they

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El Salvador: Human Rights
Special Project (1993)

- 3 -

will pay a political price for intransigence, they may be more reasonable. (For Salinas: I know there is a sizable FMLN political presence in Mexico; I hope you will use your influence with them directly, Carlos, to make it clear that Mexico expects serious bargaining in the next round, not a new offensive.)

I believe we must also give maximum support to the Secretary General in the next round by raising the level of international concern about the slow pace of progress in the peace talks. The FMLN has blocked the efforts of the Secretary General's representative to offer compromise proposals or to speed up the pace of negotiations. We need to ensure the Secretary General has these tools at his disposal.

Your efforts during the Nicaraguan elections helped bring both peace and democracy to that troubled country. I deeply appreciate your commitment to make a similar effort towards El Salvador. Please keep me informed of your efforts and know that you can count on my support.

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U.S. Department of State

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NODS DECAPTION

FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND ARA A/S ARONSON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CI

SUBJECT: NOTES ON PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
AYLWIN OVER LUNCH ON 12/06/90

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE AMBASSADOR GILLESPIE'S NOTES OF THE
MEETING AT PRESIDENT AYLWIN'S RESIDENCE ON 12/06/90:

PRESIDENT BUSH: I WANT TO SALUTE YOU AND CHILE AS AN
INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND A MAJOR LEADER IN THE HEMISPHERE.

PRESIDENT AYLWIN: WHEN WE MET IN OCTOBER IN WASHINGTON WE
COVERED THREE POINTS. I WANT TO GIVE YOU MY THANKS FOR
THREE OF THEM: OPIC, GSP AND THE LIFTING OF THE KENNEDY
AMENDMENT SANCTIONS. IT REMAINS FOR OUR ADVISORS TO WORK
OUT THE FOURTH: A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT.

PRESIDENT BUSH: THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS
INITIATIVE IS NOT A SLOGAN. CHILE IS A MODEL OF WHAT CAN
BE ACCOMPLISHED AND BRINGS IT ALL TOGETHER. YOU MENTIONED
GSP AND OPIC, THEY CAN HELP ATTRACT INVESTMENT. A FREE

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PAGE 03 OF 09 SANTIAGO 09700 00 OF 03 121906Z GR1/10 007690 NOD729
TRADE AGREEMENT IS VERY IMPORTANT. AND CHILE IS A EARLY
CANDIDATE FOR DEBT RELIEF WITH AN ENVIRONMENTAL EMHASIS,
AND, WITH IDB SUPPORT, FOR INVESTMENT SUPPORT. WE^B HAVE NO
LINGERING RESERVATION ON ANY THEME. N
P

ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, THE STEPS TAKEN BY ARGENTINA
AND BRAZIL ARE POSITIVE. I HOPE THAT SUITS CHILE, YOU
WOULD FIT AND IT WOULD ALSO FURTHER ISOLATE FIDEL. R

PEOPLE ASK WHY NOT IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CASTRO. HE IS
STILL SUPPORTING INTERVENTION AND TERRORISM. HE I
PROBABLY STILL SUPPORTING CHILEAN TERRORISTS. WE NOW HE
IS SUPPORTING THE FMLN. HE IS GOING AGAINST THE Y DE.
SOME ARGUE THAT IF WE NORMALIZE RELATIONS IT WOULD^S DETER
HIM. I WON'T IMPROVE RELATIONS WITHOUT REAL CHANG^K. I
WON'T DO THAT.

NR
12/20/82

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Pages 4-8 have been eliminated because they are
entirely irrelevant.

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PAGE 09 OF 09 SANTIA 09700 00 OF 03 121906Z C01/10 007690 NOD729

GILLESPIE

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**Subject: DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
PRESIDENT SALINAS**

Date: 10-15-1990

To: SALINAS

From: BUSH, GEORGE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED LETTER

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Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Thank you for your letter of March 25, 1991, sharing your analysis of the prospects for a successful negotiation to end the war in El Salvador. I am very encouraged by your statement that we are at the threshold of a major breakthrough in the U.N.'s efforts to mediate an end to this longstanding conflict. I strongly share your view that a concerted effort must be made to achieve political agreements and a cease-fire by the end of April. I also agree that we must use the deadline of April 30 when the current legislative assembly dissolves in order to press the parties to make a maximum effort to reach agreement on the major issues, especially a cease-fire.

The United States wholeheartedly and firmly supports the political negotiations which the U.N. under your auspices is mediating. As my administration has stated on many occasions, the United States believes that the only humane and appropriate solution to this conflict is a negotiated political settlement which allows for the peaceful reintegration of former combatants on both sides into democratic political life with full guarantees for security and human rights.

His Excellency

Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar,
Secretary General of the United Nations,
New York.

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I know that some progress has been made in the past, but I share your view that the next four weeks are the decisive moment in this negotiation. I hope that you will give this effort your personal attention and engagement to ensure the maximum possible chance for success. I am encouraged also by the efforts of Mexico, Colombia, Spain and Venezuela to play an active role, at your request, in support of a negotiated settlement and hope they will do so at the opening round of negotiations

I am confident that President Cristiani will continue to display the same good faith and flexibility that his government has demonstrated over the past year. I know that President Cristiani is deeply committed to this negotiation process and will spare no effort to see it succeed. I hope that those with influence with the FMLN will urge them to refrain from any further military actions and to negotiate in good faith on the remaining issues. The United States will do everything possible to ensure the full implementation of any agreements reached by the parties at the bargaining table.

As to the issue you raised about direct contact by the U.S. Government with the FMLN, as I have told you in the past, this is a difficult question for the United States, particularly in light of the heinous execution of two U.S. servicemen by FMLN combatants in January. Nevertheless, I take seriously your views that "such direct contacts are now of critical importance to the success of

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the peace effort." The State Department will consult with President Cristiani on this issue and assess his views about the matter you recommend. Our primary goal is to see a negotiated solution to this war as quickly as possible. After consulting with President Cristiani, my administration will weigh carefully whether and how a direct contact such as you suggest might contribute to an early cease-fire agreement.

In closing, let me reiterate my strong personal appreciation for the role that you have played in supporting these negotiations through many difficult months. The U.N. under your leadership played a decisive role in ending the conflict in Nicaragua and holding that nation's first free and fair presidential elections. An end to the conflict in El Salvador under U.N. mediation would be a great milestone in your distinguished career as Secretary General and would, I believe, put Central America permanently on the path to stability and democracy in the coming years. The United States will make every effort to support these critical negotiations and to achieve your goal of a cease-fire by the end of April.

Warmest personal wishes,

George Bush

SHARING YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION

Date: 04-04-1991

To: PEREZ DE CUELLAR, JAVIER

From: BUSH, GEORGE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED LETTER

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544-11
For your clearance

Dear Mr. President:

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El Salvador Human Rights
Special Project (1993)

Thank you for your letter of April 18, 1993 regarding your evaluation of the peace negotiations being conducted by your government, the United Nations and the FMLN and inviting me to send a representative to the talks at the appropriate time. I continue to be very impressed by your good faith and flexibility in the talks and would like to reiterate that I wholeheartedly and firmly support your efforts to achieve peace. I agree with you that sending a representative of the U.S. Government to the talks to participate in a private meeting with the representatives of your Government, the United Nations and the FMLN would be useful, and I would very much like to continue in close contact with you to decide when the timing and circumstances would be most appropriate.

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations has been instructed to inform Secretary General Perez de Cuellar that we have consulted with you in formulating my response to his request that the U.S. Government attend the peace negotiations. The Secretary General has been informed that we are now prepared to undertake a direct meeting with representatives of the FMLN in the presence of representatives of the Salvadoran Government and the United Nations if there are reasonable assurances that this will contribute significantly to the conclusion of a political agreement and a cease-fire accord. We have made it

His Excellency

Alfredo Cristiani,

President of the Republic of El Salvador,
San Salvador.

United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: JOHNSTON, DONALD
Date: 06/13/94
Case ID: S940036G

clear to the Secretary General that the United States
representative will not take a direct part in negotiations,
which are the province of the Salvadoran Government. The
Secretary General was also advised that we will continue to
consult with you as to when you believe this meeting would most
effectively contribute to an agreement.

Sincerely,

George Bush

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Subject: LETTER RE: THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JULY
24 SIGNED BY YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES REGARDING U.S. POLICY
TOWARDS EL SALVADOR

Date: 08-22-1991

To: REVEREND ANDREWS

From: BUSH, GEORGE

STATE DEPARTMENT
DRAFT REPLY

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Special Project (1993)

x/12

Release

Dear Reverend Andrews:

RELEASE

Thank you for your letter of July 24, signed by you and your colleagues in the National Council of Churches regarding U.S. policy towards El Salvador. I share your interest in the success of the peace negotiations and understand your concern that releasing the withheld funds might take the pressure off the Salvadoran Government, thereby derailing the delicate peace process.

In deciding to authorize the obligation of \$21 million this June, I have taken these important concerns into consideration. The release of aid is an attempt to balance the military needs of the Armed Forces of El Salvador with the continued imperative of maintaining pressure on the government on both the negotiations and human rights.

The Reverend

James E. Andrews,

Presbyterian Church,

475 Riverside Drive, Room 880,

New York, New York, ~~10115-0050~~

Only half of the remaining \$42.5 million is being made available for obligation at this time, and those funds are for strictly non-lethal items crucial for sustaining the Salvadoran Armed Forces at a time when the FMLN has stepped up the war. The funds will be obligated on a case-by-case basis to place orders for items such as medical supplies, field rations and spare parts as they are needed over the coming months. At a time when the FMLN has become increasingly intransigent at the bargaining table, this aid signals our firm commitment to the democratically elected Cristiani Government and the futility of the FMLN talk and fight negotiation strategy.

The guerrillas continue to attack civilian targets, such as the country's hydroelectric facilities and urban neighborhoods. They have also escalated the technological level of the war by introducing Soviet-made SA-16 surface-to-air missiles. Furthermore, the FMLN reneged on its pledge, stated publicly to the Foreign Ministers of the European Community in April, to agree to a cease-fire by May 30th. By contrast, the Government of El Salvador remains willing to sign a cease-fire agreement immediately.

I have also set aside \$5 million of the remaining \$21.5 million to support UN cease-fire and human rights verification efforts (ONUSAL and ONUCA) and the future demobilization of combatants. I share your preference to use the remaining military assistance funds to assist in the reconstruction of El Salvador

and the reintegration of combatants from both sides of the conflict into productive civilian life, and I intend to do so once a cease-fire agreement is implemented.

In no way is the release of aid intended to lessen the pressure on President Cristiani and the Government of El Salvador to make progress in the negotiations and on human rights. I continue to press the Salvadorans on the Jesuit case, a negotiated cease-fire, and post-cess-fire planning. The State Department has delivered a detailed report to Congress on these and other issues pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act.

The Jesuit case, which you mention as a particular concern of yours, remains a fundamental test for United States policy toward El Salvador, and progress on the case will determine whether and how rapidly additional military assistance will be provided. On April 10, 1991, the case was raised from investigation to trial. At present, nine military personnel, including a Colonel, are under arrest. In addition, four military personnel are charged with obstruction of justice.

The report to Congress I mentioned makes it clear that the Salvadoran Armed Forces' cooperation with the Jesuit investigation has been ^{not} ~~less than entirely~~ satisfactory to date. We continue to insist on a full ~~and complete~~ investigation and prosecution of ~~all~~ those responsible for the Jesuit killings, and a ~~continued~~ commitment to ~~improvement in human rights on the part of the~~

*improvement in the human rights performance
of the security forces.*

in the Jesuit case
~~government~~ Jury selection is expected to begin in a few weeks,
and we will be closely monitoring the continuing progress of the
case. If need be, I can determine at any time that the government
has failed to conduct a ^{thorough} and professional investigation and
prosecution of the Jesuit case and terminate military assistance.

I share your hope that a settlement will be achieved soon and
that funds can be used solely for peaceful purposes in El
Salvador. Until the FMLN realizes that war is no longer an option
in El Salvador, however, meaningful advances in the negotiation
process will be difficult to achieve.

Sincerely,

George Bush

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Subject: *LE RE: THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF
SEPTEMBER 10, CONCERNING YOUR REQUEST TO CEASE
MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR

Date: 10-11-1991

To: HEYSER, MARY

From: BUSH, GEORGE

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United States Department of State

Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520-7427

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Dear Ms. Heyser:

Thank you for your letter of September 10, concerning your request to cease military aid to El Salvador.

In deciding how best to administer military assistance for El Salvador, the Administration takes into consideration the delicacy of the ongoing negotiations between the Government of El Salvador (GOES) and the FMLN, as well as the continuing conflict.

On September 25 in New York, under the stewardship of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, the GOES and the FMLN signed an agreement on reintegration of the FMLN into Salvadoran society and agreed on an agenda of remaining issues. Compliance with agreements is to be supervised by the Commission for the Consolidation of the Peace (COPAZ), made up of representatives of the GOES, FMLN and the political parties, with Catholic Church and UN observers. The next round of technical team negotiations will resume in Mexico City on October 12. We hope that these meetings will lead to a cease-fire in the near future.

Unfortunately, the conflict has not abated despite the peace talks. The guerrillas continue to attack civilian targets, such as the country's hydroelectric facilities and urban neighborhoods, and they have escalated the technological level of the war by introducing Soviet-made SA-16 surface-to-air missiles. Therefore we will provide the Armed Forces of El Salvador with \$8.455 million for medical supplies, field rations, and spare parts, all non-lethal items necessary for sustaining the government's defense against the FMLN.

We share your desire to support peace in El Salvador. To that end, we have added \$8 million to the \$5 million already set aside in a "Peace Fund" to support UN cease-fire and human rights verification efforts and demobilization of combatants. The Administration is currently planning ways in which to use future military aid for peaceful purposes as soon as the conflict ends.

Thank you for your concern for U.S. policy in El Salvador. I hope you find this information helpful.

Sincerely,

United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: THEODORE HEAVNER
Date: 06/03/94
Case ID: S9400361

Office of Central American Affairs

Subject: TALKING POINTS RE: HAITI JEAN BERTRAND
ARISTIDE AND GEORGE BUSH MEETING

Date: 12-31-1991

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR *Heam*

Date: 7/6/96

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EXCISE**UNCLASSIFIED**TALKING POINTS*SOIA*THE COUP

- I am delighted that you are safe and well and that we were able to help arrange your departure.
- We have condemned the attack against the constitutional system in Haiti in the strongest possible terms. This is a serious setback not only for Haiti but for the cause of democracy throughout the Hemisphere.
- You are not alone. Reaction throughout the region, in the OAS, and elsewhere including Europe, has been swift and very sharp. President Perez of Venezuela was only one of the many friends to show support for you and your government.

U.S. ACTIONS

- I was very pleased to receive your Ambassador on Tuesday when he presented his credentials to me. We continue to regard him as the representative of the legitimate government of Haiti.
- The U.S. has suspended all assistance to Haiti but will review at an early date possible resumption of support for private organizations that provide help directly to the people. We do not wish to worsen the plight of the poor.

OAS ACTIONS

- We are pleased by the rapid response of the OAS. Secretary General Baena Soares (by EHNA soAREez) moved quickly to call a meeting of the Permanent Council on Monday evening and a Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Wednesday.
- We are also pleased by the strong resolution approved by the Foreign Ministers, especially the agreement that additional measures may be taken if necessary.
- I urge you to lend your public support and encouragement to Secretary General Baena Soares' efforts.

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NEXT STEPS

- We and you share the same goal -- your peaceful return to Haiti -- but you have a role in ensuring the peace.
- [] (B)
- The army will not yield power to you if they think they and their families will be at the mercy of mobs once you return. You must make it clear that this will not be permitted.

SECURITY OF AMERICANS IN HAITI

- There are several thousand American citizens in Haiti. We are concerned about their safety.
- With emotions running high, there is a danger of misunderstanding of the U.S. position and our role in events of the past few days. The potential for mob violence is dangerously high.
- I ask that you urge your followers to explain our support for your government and counsel calm.

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Subject: RP RE: HAITI JEAN BERTRAND ARISTIDE AND
GEORGE BUSH MEETING

Date: 12-31-1991

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EXCISE^{B1}

BACKGROUND

SETTING

- Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first freely elected president, was ousted by a military coup September 30.
 - He is in Washington at the invitation of OAS Secretary General Baena Soares to address the October 2 Meeting of Foreign Ministers on the Haitian situation.
 - Aristide had just returned from the UN General Assembly when the coup occurred. He was to meet with the President October 8 during a private visit to Washington.
- He has harshly denounced the military leaders who removed him and pledged to lead a fight against them.

THE COUP

- The insurrection, reflecting deep military hostility toward Aristide, grew quickly from what appeared to be an isolated disturbance by enlisted personnel to a full-fledged coup, joined in by key officers.
 - The officer corps is described as "ecstatic" over the removal of Aristide, who they feared was creating a rival security force.
 - Despite earlier protestations that he would not cooperate with the mutineers, armed forces commander Raoul Cedras (an Aristide appointee) named himself head of a three-member junta. There are subsequent signs that Cedras wants to back away from this role.
- Aristide's life was in serious danger during the coup. He was roughed up and humiliated by the military personnel who seized him.
- Preliminary reports indicate a score of deaths, although there are reports of many more casualties. The situation is tense but quiet, punctuated by scattered gunfire. The populace remains indoors.

U.S. ACTIONS

- From the earliest hours of the mutiny Ambassador Adams maintained contact with Aristide and urged military leaders to support the government.
- We have strongly condemned the coup. We regard Aristide as Haiti's legitimate leader and have called for restoration of democratic rule.

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- All U.S. aid (including humanitarian assistance) to Haiti (\$66 million remaining from FY 91, \$95 million for FY 92) has been suspended.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION

- Other major donors including France and Canada have announced a suspension of aid.
- The OAS condemned the coup in a strongly worded resolution on September 30 that called for restoration of the Aristide government.
- The OAS invoked for the first time the automatic mechanism created earlier this year to respond to the extralegal removal of democratically elected governments.
- The Foreign Ministers who met under this mechanism created a delegation, headed by OAS Secretary General Baena Soares, to travel to Haiti and inform the perpetrators of the coup that they will be isolated within the hemisphere.
- The Ministers also agreed to take additional necessary and appropriate measures to restore Haiti's democratic government if the delegation is unsuccessful.

SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN HAITI

- There are some 7,000 U.S. citizens in Haiti. Most are dual nationals and American citizen children of Haitians, but there are 750 USG personnel and dependents, business people, and representatives of private voluntary organizations.
- There have been no threats against Americans, and Ambassador Adams has not concluded that an evacuation is needed.
- Nevertheless, the potential for mob violence--based on false rumors already circulated about our role in the coup--remains extremely high. Aristide can help by counseling calm.

ARISTIDE'S TROUBLED TENURE

- The military revolt dramatized and brought to a head resentment that had been building against Aristide in many quarters.

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-3-

- Confronted by lingering Duvalierism and a suspicious military, [Aristide invoked "people's power" and cultivated the support of Haiti's masses.] The continuing deterioration of Haiti's economy has also diminished the mass support he formerly enjoyed.

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